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INTRODUCTION 
[The government] was armed with more power than any of the 
kings . . . had ever possessed. For it had become, in fact, an 
absolute sovereign, and in addition the heir of a revolution which 
had broken down all the barriers that laws, customs, and mores had 
previously opposed to the abuse and sometimes to the use of 
power.                                       
             Alexis de Tocqueville1 
 
Liberal democracy is like a game in which many of the rules are 
unwritten. The importance of these unwritten rules becomes obvious 
as soon as they are discarded or disregarded. Whether the rules are 
discarded or disregarded, at some point it becomes unclear whether the 
same game is still even being played. 
Since games are typically defined by their rules, the idea of 
“unwritten rules” introduces an element of uncertainty. But this is not 
the kind of uncertainty that makes the right decision harder to 
determine,2 or the wrong decision easier to conceal, confuse, or 
explain away.3 Nor is it the kind of uncertainty that general principles 
and broad norms bring to the relatively straightforward rules they 
underwrite and justify.4 H.L.A. Hart wrote of the “open texture” of 
 
1 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE REVOLUTION 191 
(François Furet & Françoise Mélonio eds., Alan S. Kahan trans., 2001). 
2 See, e.g., James Comey, Opinion, A Critique That Strengthens the F.B.I., N.Y. 
TIMES, June 15, 2018, at A25 (“I was not certain I was right about those things 
at the time. That’s the nature of hard decisions; they don’t allow for certainty.”). 
3 See, e.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Maggie Haberman, Trump Embraces 
Shadowy Plots, Eroding Trust, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2018, at A1. 
Mr. Trump’s willingness to peddle suspicion as fact . . . is a vital 
ingredient in the president’s communications arsenal, a social 
media-fueled, brashly expressed narrative of dubious accusations 
and dark insinuations that allows him to promote his own version 
of reality . . . . “He’s the blame shifter in chief,” said Gwenda 
Blair, a Trump biographer . . . . “It goes to this idea that you can’t 
believe anything that you read or see. He has sold us a whole way 
of accepting a narrative that has so many layers of unaccountable, 
unsubstantiated content that you can’t possibly peel it all back.” 
 Id. 
4 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22–28 (1978). “[R]ules . . . 
set out legal consequences that follow automatically when the conditions 
200 UMass Law Review v. 15 | 197 
law.5 There is much to be filled in (or out, as the case may be), many 
implications that need implementing, and many concrete details to be 
distilled from the spare language of a rule. 
In a well-functioning liberal democracy, this “play in the joints” is 
normally lubricated by established institutional practices that draw on 
institutional memory, situational judgments that fall well within the 
realm of rationality, a shared sense of moral purpose, and not least by 
common sense and good faith. These all inform the “unwritten rules” 
of liberal democracy. Otherwise, where the written rules end, 
authoritarian tyranny may well begin. 
This Article is set amidst the distinctly unsettled and unsettling 
state of governmental practices, legislative policy, and presidential 
politics of contemporary America. Immediacy, too, introduces its own 
uncertainty—as compared to the comfortable vantage point of the 
distant future. But, as I shall argue, there is no realistic alternative to 
beginning in medias res. To address these issues as they inherently 
demand, the usual precedents and protocols and precautions must be 
set aside—if they are not already “gone with the wind.”6 
Since the 2016 Presidential Election, and even before, threats to 
liberal democracy have emerged, in plausible form, as never before in 
 
provided are met . . . . A principle . . . states a reason that argues in one 
direction, but does not necessitate a particular decision.” Id. at 25–26. 
5 See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124–36 (2d ed. 1994). 
Even when verbally formulated general rules are used, 
uncertainties as to the form of behaviour required by them may 
break out in particular concrete cases . . . . 
     . . . . 
     The open texture of law means that there are, indeed, areas of 
conduct where much must be left to be developed by courts or 
officials striking a balance . . . between competing interests . . . . 
 Id. at 126, 135. 
6  Come writers and critics 
  Who prophesize with your pen 
  And keep your eyes wide 
  The chance won’t come again 
  And don’t speak too soon 
  For the wheel’s still in spin . . . 
  For the times they are a-changin’ 
 BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are A-Changin’, on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-
CHANGIN’ (Warner Bros. Inc. 1964). 
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American history. This is largely a tale about the parlous state of 
“unwritten rules” in a thoroughly politicized polity. Part I traces out 
two of the most important stages in this development. 
Liberal democracy depends not only on governmental institutions 
and officials but, indirectly, on the personal qualities those officials 
bring to their duties and responsibilities. Nowhere is this more 
important than at the top of the Executive Branch of government, 
where personality disorders of the President may take on constitutional 
significance. “Crazytown”—as it has been called—is thus the subject 
of Part II.7 
Finally, Part III considers the roles of both “Input Controls” and 
“Output Controls” in protecting liberal democracy against the threat of 
authoritarian tyranny. For purposes of discussion, a proposed 
constitutional amendment is introduced and defended. This is an 
important intellectual exercise, for “without the constant effort to 
repair and construct liberal institutions of government . . . it is only a 
matter of time before one or another zealot will seize the chance to 
impose his private nightmare on the rest of us.”8 
I. A LEGACY OF ILLEGITIMACY 
A. Advice and Consent in the Shadow of the Law 
On February 12, 2016, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia took 
a trip to a remote resort ranch in Texas. The location—in the extreme 
Southwest corner of Texas, barely forty miles from the Mexican 
border—was hundreds of miles from any major highways, so the 
preferred way of getting there was by private plane from Houston to an 
airstrip on the vast, mountainous ranch.9 On the day of his arrival, 
Justice Scalia observed some of the activities and was driven to some 
hunting sites. In the evening, he had dinner with friends and 
acquaintances at the main lodge, but he retired somewhat early, citing 
 
7 See Philip Rucker & Robert Costa, Bob Woodward’s New Book Reveals a 
‘Nervous Breakdown’ of Trump’s Presidency, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2018, 11:08 
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/bob-woodwards-new-book-
reveals-a-nervous-breakdown-of-trumps-presidency/2018/09/04/b27a389e-ac60-
11e8-a8d7-0f63ab8b1370_story.html [https://perma.cc/VP5W-9P44] (“We’re in 
Crazytown.” (quoting White House Chief of Staff John F. Kelly)). 
8 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 313 (1980). 
9 See Alan Blinder & Manny Fernandez, Texas Ranch is Rugged Oasis for the 
Famous, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2016, at A23. 
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tiredness. Sometime during the night of February 12-13, Justice Scalia 
fell into a deep sleep—a sleep from which he was never to awaken.10 
The next morning, when Justice Scalia did not come to breakfast or 
subsequent events, the ranch owner, John Poindexter, went to check on 
him. Justice Scalia was lying serenely in bed, seemingly undisturbed—
but not alive. “[I]t took no medical training . . . to recognize that 
Justice Scalia was dead.”11 
Chaos quickly ensued. There were no doctors or officials anywhere 
on the premises who could render any relevant assistance equal to the 
task at hand.12 Thus, a sitting Supreme Court Justice was officially 
pronounced dead—over the telephone—by a county judge many miles 
away, on the assurances of those random laymen present at the scene 
that the Justice was, indeed, dead.13 
The news quickly began to spread eastward toward Washington, 
D.C. There, chaos ensued all over again, though on a much grander 
scale. The political, legal, and institutional significance of Scalia’s 
death could hardly be overstated. He was the intellectual leader of the 
Court’s conservative wing, the epicenter of its considerable moral 
force, an ideological inspiration to like-minded conservatives such as 
Clarence Thomas, and a genial, gregarious friend to liberals like Elena 
Kagan and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.14 He was the proverbial 
“heavyweight,” with a personality larger than life. Jeffrey Toobin 
wrote of him at the time of the Citizens United case: 
More than anyone, Scalia was responsible for transforming the 
dynamics of oral arguments at the Supreme Court. When Scalia 
became a Justice, in 1986, the Court sessions were often somnolent 
affairs, but his rapid-fire questioning spurred his colleagues to try 
to keep pace, and, as Roberts said, in a tribute to Scalia on his 
twenty-fifth anniversary as a Justice, “the place hasn’t been the 
 
10 See Alan Blinder & Manny Fernandez, Owner of Texas Ranch Recalls Finding 
Justice’s Body, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2016, at A14. 
11 Id. 
12 See Eva Ruth Moravec et al., The Death of Antonin Scalia: Chaos, Confusion, 




13 See id. 
14 See Adam Liptak, Justice Scalia, Who Led Court’s Conservative Renaissance, 
Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2016, at A1. 
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same since.” Alternately witty and fierce, Scalia invariably made 
clear where he stood.15 
The ground began to shift—and not in a good way—beneath 
conservative centers of power like Washington think tanks and the 
offices of Republican Senators and Congressmen all across Capitol 
Hill. The portentous implications ran far beyond even the wildest 
dreams that liberal schemers could have concocted on their own. At 
the time, the Court was finely balanced between four solid, reliable 
conservatives and four solid, reliable liberals; the balancing point (and 
the fifth vote) was the fickle and unreliable Anthony Kennedy. 
Subtracting Justice Scalia’s vote from the conservative column and 
adding it to the liberal column portended a five-Justice liberal majority 
that could prevail indefinitely—with or without the help of Justice 
Kennedy. Replacing Justice Scalia with an Obama appointee would 
rival in magnitude the Court’s greatest ideological shift ever, when 
ultra-liberal Justice Thurgood Marshall was replaced by arch-
conservative Justice Clarence Thomas—a parting gift of President 
George H.W. Bush. 
Hence, the chaos in Washington following Justice Scalia’s death. 
A conservative political calamity was on the cusp of unfolding; a 
massive legal realignment was palpably in sight. But amidst all the 
sound and the fury, there quietly emerged one man who—by his swift, 
decisive, and prescient actions—gave the impression of having 
prepared far in advance (indeed, his whole life) for just this moment. 
That man was Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. 
Within hours of the news that Justice Scalia had died, Senator 
McConnell issued a Press Release in which he and his wife pur-
portedly sent “our deepest condolences to the entire Scalia family.” 
Today our country lost an unwavering champion of a timeless 
document that unites each of us as Americans. Justice Scalia’s 
fidelity to the Constitution was rivaled only by the love of his 
family: his wife Maureen, his nine children, and his many 
grandchildren. Through the sheer force of his intellect and his 
legendary wit, this giant of American jurisprudence almost 
singlehandedly revived an approach to constitutional interpretation 
that prioritized the text and original meaning of the Constitution. 
 
15 Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited: How Chief Justice John Roberts Orchestrated 
the Citizens United Decision, NEW YORKER, May 21, 2012, at 36. 
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Elaine and I send our deepest condolences to the entire Scalia 
family.16 
But this was no ordinary letter of “condolences”; it ended with an 
ominous, dagger-like twist: “The American people should have a voice 
in the selection of their next Supreme Court Justice. Therefore, this 
vacancy should not be filled until we have a new President.”17 (Just in 
case anyone missed the point, those last two sentences were set in 
bold-face type.) Thus, what purported to be a note of sympathy 
actually appears, on closer inspection, to be the vehicle for announcing 
a brazen political gambit: the Senate would not even consider a 
Supreme Court nominee during President Obama’s final year in 
office—regardless of who that nominee might be. 
The stated purpose of this unprecedented refusal was to give the 
American people “a voice in the selection of their next Supreme Court 
Justice.”18 But of course, the American people already had a “voice” 
in the selection of Justice Scalia’s successor: they elected President 
Barack Obama (twice) who, according to the Constitution, “shall 
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court.”19 
The Constitution makes no attempt to distribute opportunities for 
making Supreme Court appointments “evenly” among Presidents, nor 
does it do anything to guard against an “uneven” distribution. 
(President Jimmy Carter, for example, never had the opportunity to 
appoint a single Justice during his four-year term of office.)20 Instead, 
the matter is left entirely to chance and the vagaries and vicissitudes of 
death and resignation. One might say that it is “random” and in this 
sense similar to decision by a fair (i.e., random) lottery. 
On this point there is substantial agreement with a maritime 
condition of extremity “for which all writers have prescribed the same 
rule:”21 
 
16 Press Release, Mitch McConnell, Senate Majority Leader, Justice Antonin 
Scalia (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.republicanleader.senate.gov/newsroom/ 
press-releases/justice-antonin-scalia [https://perma.cc/9KY9-QSAT] (Statement 
on the Passing of Justice Antonin Scalia). 
17 Id. (emphasis added). 
18 Id. (emphasis added). 
19 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
20 Judgeship Appointments by President, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/apptsbypres.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RG7-QXYZ]. 
21 United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 367 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383). 
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When the ship is in no danger of sinking, but all sustenance is 
exhausted, and a sacrifice of one person is necessary to appease the 
hunger of others, the selection is by lot. This mode is resorted to as 
the fairest mode, and, in some sort, as an appeal to God, for 
selection of the victim.22 
Likewise, it is as if the opportunities for Supreme Court appointments 
are determined by God. (At least, that is one way of reading what the 
Constitution contemplates.) God determines whether the Scalia seat 
will become vacant during the Obama Presidency or during the Trump 
Presidency. 
This possibility Senator McConnell could not abide—this matter 
was far too important to be left to God. Thus, the good Senator thought 
to himself: “It is as if I were God. For I, too, can shift the Scalia 
vacancy from the Obama Presidency into the Trump Presidency.” 
“And so it was. God saw all he had made, and indeed it was very 
good.”23 
Senator McConnell was aided in this grandest of larcenies by the 
fact that most of the “rules” governing Supreme Court appointments 
are unwritten. Again, the spare but imperative constitutional language 
states only that “[t]he President . . . shall nominate, and by and with 
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the 
supreme Court.”24 All the rest is unwritten: the courtesy visits, the 
Judiciary Committee hearings, statements and testimony by the 
nominee, expert testimony before the Committee, a Committee vote, 
referral to the full Senate, debate on the Senate floor, and finally a 
Senate vote. 
Again, Senator McConnell undoubtedly thought to himself: 
This case is far too consequential to risk all that. Chief Judge 
Merrick Garland [President Obama’s nominee] may very well 
prove to be an exceptionally qualified jurist of the highest caliber. 
There is too much—politically—at stake here to risk that. There 
must be no Committee hearings, no Committee vote, no Senate 
vote—nothing. Not even so much as a handshake for that poor 
hostage Garland. 
And so it was. 
As discussed below, I believe that President Obama, and perhaps 
Judge Garland himself, could plausibly have invoked the legal system 
to argue the contrary. There is a federal common law of Supreme 
 
22 Id. (emphasis added). 
23 Genesis 1:31 (Jerusalem Bible) (emphasis added). 
24 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
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Court appointments, and no comparable nominee has ever been 
categorically denied the opportunity even to be considered.25 
     The historical rule that best accounts for the entire history of 
Supreme Court appointments is . . . the following: Although the 
Senate has the constitutional power to provide advice and consent 
on particular Supreme Court nominees (and hence to reject or 
resist individual nominees on the merits), the Senate may only 
deliberately transfer one President’s Supreme Court appointment 
powers to an unknown successor . . . if there are contemporaneous 
questions about the status of the nominating President as the most 
recently elected President.26 
Nevertheless, the Senate Judiciary Committee endorsed 
McConnell’s approach with a statement signed by all the Republican 
members of the Committee.27 The stakes could hardly have been 
higher, and it was crucially important to shape and frame perceptions 
quickly, even before they had time to form. (One hallmark of an 
illegitimate sales pitch is to deny the audience any opportunity to 
reflect on what it is being sold.)28 That meant: shifting debate away 
 
25 See, e.g., Robin Bradley Kar & Jason Mazzone, The Garland Affair: What 
History and the Constitution Really Say About President Obama’s Powers to 
Appoint a Replacement for Justice Scalia, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 73–76 
(2016). 
[T]here have been 103 prior cases in total in which—as in the case 
of Obama’s nomination of Garland—an elected President 
nominated someone to fill an actual Supreme Court vacancy prior 
to the election of the President’s successor. In all 103 cases, which 
go all the way back to the earliest days of the Republic, the sitting 
President has been able both to nominate and appoint a 
replacement Justice—by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. 
     . . . . 
[T]here is no case in U.S. history where an elected President 
nominated a Supreme Court Justice during an election year (but 
prior to the election of his presidential successor) and failed to 
appoint a replacement Justice. 
 Id. at 73, 75 (second emphasis added). 
26 Id. at 60 (emphasis added). 
27 Letter from Senate Judiciary Comm., to Mitch McConnell, Senate Majority 
Leader (Feb. 23, 2016), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2719115/ 
Senate-SCOTUS-Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7EF-UDQX]. 
28 See, e.g., Charles W. Collier, Intellectual Authority and Institutional Authority, 
42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 151, 166 (1992). 
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from the merits of any particular nominee and toward the issue of 
whether there should be an election-year appointment at all. So, 
shortly after Justice Scalia’s untimely death, the Republicans on the 
Senate Judiciary Committee issued a McConnell-style broadside—
addressed to McConnell himself: 
     We intend to exercise the constitutional power granted the 
Senate under Article II, Section 2 to ensure the American people 
are not deprived of the opportunity to engage in a full and robust 
debate over the type of jurist they wish to decide some of the most 
critical issues of our time . . . . 
     Accordingly, given the particular circumstances under which 
this vacancy arises, we wish to inform you of our intention to 
exercise our constitutional authority to withhold consent on any 
nominee to the Supreme Court submitted by this President to fill 
Justice Scalia’s vacancy.29 
This is a little like saying: “We intend to exercise our constitutional 
power and authority by not exercising them.” 
At any rate, a letter from eleven Senate Republicans to their 
Majority Leader is of no constitutional significance. However, it could 
be considered a shot across the bow—an unofficial warning that the 
Senate might be planning to abdicate its constitutional duties and 
responsibilities that year. After all, the Constitution does not say: “The 
President shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court—unless the 
Senate elects not to participate in the appointments process that 
year.”30 In fact, the Constitution recognizes no way that the Senate 
 
     Milgram’s experiments were . . . conducted in an atmosphere of 
great pressure, both temporal and psychological. The experiments 
were very smoothly run, highly engineered, “slick” productions. 
They took place over a thirty-minute time period, in a confined and 
narrow context that afforded no time for thought, no opportunity 
for exploration or reflection. It may be that Milgram’s results are 
strictly limited to these conditions; under these conditions, and 
perhaps only under these conditions, subjects rely on institutional 
authority to the extent documented by Milgram. 
 Id. (footnote omitted). 
29 Letter from Senate Judiciary Comm., supra note 27. 
30 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the 
supreme Court . . . .”). 
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could lawfully do this. “Not participating” is not a constitutionally 
recognized option under either the written or unwritten law.31 
The written law of the Constitution poses two major problems for 
this approach. As Kar and Mazzone write: 
First, the full Senate is not acting to provide advice at all in such 
circumstances. Rather, a number of Republicans on the Senate 
Judiciary Committee are preventing floor debates on the ultimate 
question whether the Senate advises and consents to the Garland 
nomination. Second, and more practically, advice that takes the 
form of “we will not act on any nominee [of President Barack 
Obama]” cannot provide [that] President with any actionable 
advice for how to nominate a candidate who might be appointed 
through the Constitution’s designated mechanisms.32 
Mitch McConnell cannot and does not speak for “the Senate.” Senate 
Judiciary Committee Chairman Charles Grassley cannot and does not 
speak for “the Senate,” nor does his faithful cohort of Judiciary 
Committee Republicans. 
More fundamentally, even if the full Senate were involved, there is 
no lawful way it could (in the Judiciary Committee Republicans’ 
words) “withhold consent on any nominee to the Supreme Court 
submitted by this President.”33 Such a general option or power or 
authority does not exist—anywhere in the Constitution. It exists only 
in the wishful thinking of people like Mitch McConnell (and, perhaps, 
in a fabled, far-away place called Neverland). The duty to “advise and 
consent” arises only in the context of a specific nomination that has 
already been made by the President, as specified in Article II, not 
Article I.34 The Senate’s duty is, in this sense, “auxiliary” to the 
expressly enumerated powers of the President—not the reverse. 
 
31 It has been suggested that “[a] more likely construction is that the Senate’s 
refusal to consider constitutes a withholding of consent.” Email from Russell L. 
Weaver, Professor of Law, Univ. of Louisville, to Charles W. Collier, Professor 
of Law and Philosophy, Univ. of Fla. (Aug. 7, 2018, 5:54 PM) (on file with 
author). Aside from the not-inconsiderable fact that “the Senate” was never 
involved, this interpretation would be relevant only if the Constitution were a 
kind of logical and psychological guidebook as to How People Think. Instead, it 
is more like a Handbook of Limited Governance that underwrites no logical or 
psychological inferences—however valid they might be in the abstract—not 
clearly included in the Handbook itself. 
32 Kar & Mazzone, supra note 25, at 83–84. 
33 Letter from Senate Judiciary Comm., supra note 27 (emphasis added). 
34 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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The Constitution unambiguously assigns to the President the 
powers of nomination and appointment—the President “shall nom-
inate” and “shall appoint.” With this second “shall,” the Senate is 
brought imperatively into the process: “by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate.”35 Once President Obama nominated Chief 
Judge Merrick Garland, it was up to the Senate to “advise” and 
“consent” or not consent. 
[T]he President has constitutional powers at both the nomination 
and the appointment stages. Regardless of what it means to 
provide advice and consent, senatorial refusal to consider any 
nominee from a particular President with the express purpose of 
transferring his appointment powers to a successor may therefore 
implicate a deeper problem of separation of powers.36 
Nevertheless, the Senate still did nothing.37 
The unwritten law of the Constitution is equally conclusive and 
unsparing. A long-standing and unbroken line of practice creates a 
(rebuttable) presumption that the practice should be followed.38 
There is . . . simply no historical precedent—recent or otherwise—
for the deliberate transfer of presidential authority that Senate 
Republicans seek to effect with respect to the Supreme Court 
vacancy left by Justice Scalia. To the contrary, . . . a long-standing 
and unbroken line of historical practice emerges.39 
 
35 Id. 
36 Kar & Mazzone, supra note 25, at 91. 
37 If, by simply doing nothing, the Senate could effectively divest the President of 
his constitutional powers of appointment, unacceptable separation-of-powers 
concerns would be presented. See, e.g., id. at 92. 
The outright senatorial refusal to consider any nominee from the 
current President in a deliberate attempt to divest him of his 
Supreme Court appointment powers (and transfer them to his 
successor) may go beyond the provision of “advice and consent,” 
as it has traditionally been construed in the context of Supreme 
Court appointments, to undermine one of the President’s 
constitutionally-designated powers. 
 Id. Thus, the reading in the text is preferred. 
38 Eight Justices have been nominated during an election year, and all eight of 
them, including Benjamin Cardozo and Louis Brandeis, were successfully 
confirmed. An additional five nominations were made in election years after the 
election of the nominating President’s successor; yet these nominees were 
confirmed as well, for a total of thirteen election-year appointments. See id. at 
74–75. 
39 Id. at 72–73. However, Kar and Mazzone note that: 
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In relation to executive power, as Justice Frankfurter explained, “a 
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the 
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . . may be 
treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by [the 
Constitution].”40 The Senate Republicans’ plan thus labors under the 
combined burden of two complementary presumptions: (1) the 
presumption that a long-standing and unbroken line of practice should 
be followed (formal consideration of any nominee submitted in good 
order by any President); and (2) the presumption that a radical 
departure from a long-standing and unbroken line of practice should 
not be followed (the purported withholding of consent to any nominee 
submitted by a particular President—for the express purpose of 
transferring that President’s constitutional powers of appointment to a 
 
[T]he Senate has only refused to consider a President’s Supreme 
Court nominations in the highly unusual circumstance where the 
nominating President’s status as the most recently elected 
President has been in doubt . . . . [T]he Republican plan is 
historically unprecedented and . . . in fact presents a major 
departure from more than two centuries of historical tradition. 
 Id. at 58, 61. 
     Our principal historical conclusions therefore hold true without 
exception. Put simply, the Senate has sometimes used its “advice 
and consent” powers to shape some Presidents’ Supreme Court 
choices—either by rejecting or resisting some particular nominees 
on their merits and with full Senate consideration. Absent 
contemporaneous doubts about the status of a nominating President 
as the most recently-elected President, however, the Senate has 
never before acted as if it had the further power to completely 
divest a sitting President of his Supreme Court appointment 
powers. 
 Id. at 82. 
[Addressing] these objections . . . reveal[s] just how powerful the 
historical tradition is in the context of Supreme Court appoint-
ments, . . . expose[s] the grave pragmatic and constitutional risks 
of continuing forward with the Senate Republicans’ current 
plan, . . . and risks significant harm to the Court. The costs of 
mischief are all the greater where, as here, there is also a plausible 
argument that the plan violates the Constitution. 
 Id. at 73, 106. 
40 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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successor). Furthermore, there are surrounding circumstances in this 
particular case that tend to support a presumption of consent. 
The Senate had every opportunity—under its normal procedures—
to consider Judge Garland’s nomination and vote it down. That would 
have been constitutionally (if not politically) unobjectionable and 
uncontroversial. Yet, Senator McConnell and his Republican 
colleagues pointedly did not do so—indeed, they were afraid to do 
this—because Judge Garland was rightfully perceived as one of the 
best and brightest candidates ever nominated to the Supreme Court.41 
Once the American public saw and heard Judge Garland on 
television—there would have been “hell to pay” for voting against 
him. 
Under these circumstances, the Senate’s silence takes on added 
significance. Not all silences are equal, and in this case there may 
arguably have been sufficient surrounding circumstances to support a 
presumption of consent. Unofficially, it would have been hard to find 
any real criticism of Judge Garland himself from any Senator of either 
party.42 
 
41 See, e.g., KAROL CORBIN WALKER, AM. BAR ASS’N, STATEMENT CONCERNING 
THE NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE MERRICK B, GARLAND 8–9 (2016). 
In undertaking its extensive nationwide investigation of the 
professional qualifications of Judge Garland, the Standing 
Committee wrote to and invited input relevant to our investigation 
from 3,085 persons, including all federal appellate and district 
judges, and magistrate judges, as well as many state judges, 
lawyers, and community and bar representatives who were likely 
to have personal knowledge of his professional qualifications. 
 Id. at 4. 
The unanimous consensus of everyone we interviewed was that 
Judge Garland is superbly competent to serve on the United States 
Supreme Court. This significant point warrants repeating: all of the 
experienced, dedicated, and knowledgeable sitting judges, several 
former solicitor generals from both political parties, legal scholars 
from top law schools across the country, and lawyers who have 
worked with or against the nominee in private practice, 
government or within the judiciary describe the nominee as 
outstanding in all respects and cite specific evidence in support of 
that view. 
 Id. at 8–9. 
42 See id. at 5 (“Most remarkably, in interviews with hundreds of individuals in the 
legal profession and community who knew Judge Garland, whether for a few 
years or decades, not one person uttered a negative word about him.”). 
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Thus it was left to President Obama to read these uncertain tea 
leaves as best he could. Rather than assume that the Senate had 
unlawfully abandoned its constitutional role in appointments,43 a more 
charitable interpretation of the Senatorial silence might be: “This is all 
the ‘Advice and Consent’ you are going to get.” In many 
circumstances silence may reasonably be understood as assent; e.g.: 
Dearly beloved: We have come together in the presence of God to 
witness and bless the joining together of this man and this woman 
in Holy Matrimony . . . . 
     . . . . 
     . . . If any of you can show just cause why they may not 
lawfully be married, speak now; or else for ever hold your peace.44 
Having dispensed with the unwritten law themselves, the Republican 
Senators could hardly complain if President Obama turned to the 
written law, which specifies no particular form for the Senate’s 
“Advice and Consent.” (Originally, this consultation was quite brief 
and informal, without committee hearings.)45 Numerous commentators 
have confirmed that the “Advice and Consent” clause lends itself to 
various forms of implementation. The former Dean of the Senate, 
Robert Byrd, stated in a 2005 speech that: “There is no stipulation in 
the Constitution as to how the Senate is to express its advice or give its 
consent.”46 Jonathan Adler has likewise observed: “The appointments 
clause . . . does not impose an affirmative duty to consider a nominee 
in any particular way . . . . [O]ne cannot consider Senate conduct in 
isolation. After all . . . the process necessarily involves engagement 
between the executive and legislative branch.”47 Finally, as Kar and 
Mazzone put it: “A President’s power to appoint a Supreme Court 
Justice has both constitutional and extra-constitutional dimensions. 
The power clearly arises from the Constitution but it is exercised 
 
43 A standard principle of judicial restraint is not to address or decide constitutional 
questions that do not have to be addressed or decided. 
44 THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER, THE CELEBRATION AND BLESSING OF A 
MARRIAGE 423–24 (2006). 
45 Russell L. Weaver, “Advice and Consent” in Historical Perspective, 64 DUKE 
L.J. 1717, 1731–32 (2015). 
46 151 CONG. REC. 4351, 4365 (2005) (emphasis added). 
47 Jonathan H. Adler, The Senate Has No Constitutional Obligation to Consider 
Nominees, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 15, 19, 31 (2016). 
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through a process of engagement—‘advice and consent’—with the 
Senate.”48 
Thus, in the unprecedented absence of any express grant or 
withholding of “consent” to his nominee, President Obama would have 
been well within his rights to declare the “Advice and Consent” 
requirement presumptively satisfied. (The party doing nothing 
constitutionally relevant cannot very well complain that its inaction 
should be interpreted in a particular way.) For purposes of rebutting 
the presumption of consent, the individual Senators could all have 
been given a specified period, during which they could go officially on 
the record as opposing the appointment (a new, unwritten rule, 
according to which the officially expressed opposition—by a majority 
of the individual Senators—would constitute the Senate’s withholding 
of consent to an appointment). If this procedure did not yield a 
withholding of consent, President Obama could then have proceeded 
to appoint Justice Garland and sign his commission. Sometimes, 
unprecedented problems require unprecedented solutions.49 
The fact that this solution might not comport with the Senate’s 
own “Rules of Proceedings” is—under the circumstances—not a valid 
objection. As noted above, the Senate’s constitutional duty to “advise 
and consent or not consent” arises only in the context of a specific 
 
48 Kar & Mazzone, supra note 25, at 58. 
49 Under the circumstances, President Obama clearly passed up some opportunities 
for creative thinking and some solutions, unlike that in the text, that do not make 
use of a “presumption of consent.” 
(1) President Obama could have addressed a public letter to Senate 
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell informing him of his intention 
to poll the Senate on the question of “consent” to the Garland 
appointment—unless the normal procedures for considering a 
Supreme Court nominee were initiated within a reasonable time. 
(2) If this notification produced no relevant results, the President 
could then have proceeded to poll all the Senators individually, on 
the question of “consent” to the Garland appointment. Nothing in 
the written law of the Constitution precludes this (or any other) 
means of obtaining the “Advice and Consent” of the Senate. 
(3) The Senators’ responses would all be released publicly. If a 
majority of the Senators clearly favored the appointment of Judge 
Garland, the President could then proceed to appoint Justice 
Garland and sign his commission. (Otherwise, the nomination 
would be withdrawn, just as if the full Senate had voted against the 
nominee.) 
(4) Assuming someone wanted to challenge any of the above 
approaches in court, who would have standing to do so? 
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nomination that has already been made by the President; in this sense, 
the Senatorial duty is “auxiliary” to the expressly enumerated powers 
of the President. The form of this “Advice and Consent” is not in any 
way limited in Article II—nor is it even mentioned in Article I. In 
purporting to withhold consent—in advance—to any nominee 
submitted by President Obama, Senator McConnell and the 
Republican members of the Senate Judiciary Committee violated their 
own “Rules of Proceedings,” specifically Senate Rule 31, which states 
in part: “When nominations shall be made by the President of the 
United States to the Senate . . . the final question on every nomination 
shall be, ‘Will the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?’”50 
Obviously, “the Senate” was never consulted by this renegade faction 
on the question of a purported general withholding of consent—in 
advance of any particular nomination. And the “final question” as to 
“this nomination”—the Garland nomination—was obviously never 
addressed and eo ipso never answered, one way or the other, by 
anyone—least of all by “the Senate.” Thus, after refusing to allow the 
Senate to carry out its constitutional duty, these “leaders” of the Senate 
cannot very well complain when the performance of their duty is 
facilitated, in alternative fashion, by the very branch of government 
(the Executive) directly and primarily empowered by the Constitution 
to nominate and appoint (“by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate”). In this case, it seems, the Senate was “otherwise occupied,” 
in time-honored fashion, with the Great Game of partisan politics. 
Ultimately, the Garland nomination simply languished in the 
Senate for 293 days—far longer than any other Supreme Court 
nomination in U.S. history—and then expired with the end of the 
114th Congress.51 Thus, the Senate’s silence functioned in this case—
as intended—to divest President Obama of his constitutional power of 
appointment, raising unacceptable separation-of-powers concerns and 
contravening both the written and unwritten law of the Constitution: 
[T]he Senate Republicans’ . . . plan is truly unprecedented . . . . 
     . . . . 
 
50 STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, at 43 (2013) (emphasis 
added). 
51 See Jon Schuppe, Merrick Garland Now Holds the Record for Longest Supreme 
Court Wait, NBC NEWS (July 20, 2016, 2:14 PM), https:// 
www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/merrick-garland-now-holds-record-longest-
supreme-court-wait-n612541 [https://perma.cc/PLX9-JMKA]. 
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     . . . By announcing in advance that they will not consider any 
nominee from the current President, Senate Republicans may 
have . . . taken the one position that is most clearly contradicted by 
the entire history of Supreme Court appointment processes . . . . 
[H]istory strongly suggests that an outright refusal to do anything 
at all in order to deliberately transfer one President’s appointment 
power to an unknown successor . . . raises unprecedented con-
stitutional questions relating to separation of powers . . . .52 
“[S]ometimes,” writes Chief Justice Roberts, “‘the most telling 
indication of [a] severe constitutional problem . . . is the lack of 
historical precedent’ for Congress’s action.”53 In Kar and Mazzone’s 
terms, there is indeed a severe constitutional problem with the Senate 
Republicans’ plan: they are “asserting, in effect, a new constitutional 
power, which has never before been exercised in U.S. history.”54 If the 
historical tradition and respect for precedent—of which the Chief 
Justice speaks—are to be taken at all seriously, “then Senate 
Republicans lack[] this asserted power.”55 
The product of an unprecedented, unconstitutional, and, in this 
sense, unlawful process is itself unlawful or—to use a term with 
perhaps greater currency: “illegitimate.” The nomination and 
appointment of Neil Gorsuch—to the seat denied to Merrick 
Garland—was thus the illegitimate product of an unprecedented, 
unconstitutional, and, in that sense, unlawful process. It follows that 
Justice Gorsuch’s tenure at the Supreme Court is, in that sense, of 
doubtful legitimacy, along with all of his opinions and all decisions in 
which he provides the deciding vote.56 This “aura of illegitimacy,” this 
 
52 Kar & Mazzone, supra note 25, at 72, 99; cf. id. at 100 (“By construing its 
‘advice and consent’ powers to give it this new divestment power, Senate 
Republicans are therefore asserting, in effect, a new constitutional power, which 
has never before been exercised in U.S. history. If the historical tradition that we 
have uncovered has ripened into a constitutional rule, then Senate Republicans 
lacks [sic] this asserted power.”). 
53 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549 (2012) (quoting Free 
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010)). 
54 Kar & Mazzone, supra note 25, at 100. 
55 Id. 
56 See, e.g., Elizabeth Dias & Sydney Ember, G.O.P. Tactics in 2016 Pay Off in 
Gorsuch, Who Proves Decisive Figure, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2018, at A17 
(“The consequences of President Trump’s nomination of Neil M. Gorsuch to the 
Supreme Court—and the Republican blockade of President Barack Obama’s 
nomination of Merrick B. Garland in 2016 for that seat—became powerfully 
clear on Tuesday after the court’s conservative majority handed down major 
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enduring taint on the Court’s reputation, is unlikely to recede anytime 
soon—at least not until Justice Gorsuch is gone and forgotten. 
Finally, in 2018, with the retirement and replacement of Justice 
Kennedy, the tactics surrounding Justice Scalia’s successor have come 
full circle. The Court conservatives now appear to have attained—with 
two appointments—exactly what the Court liberals would, and should, 
have attained with the appointment of Merrick Garland alone: a five-
vote majority—without Justice Kennedy—that could prevail 
indefinitely.57 
 
B. Relitigating the Rules of a Presidential Election 
Suppose your local Police Chief calls a press conference and 
announces: 
I’m here to update you on an important investigation. First, I’m 
going to include more detail about our process than I ordinarily 
would, because I think the people of this town deserve those details 
in a case of intense public interest. 
Although we did not find clear evidence that the subjects of our 
inquiry intended to violate laws governing the handling of 
classified information, there is evidence that they were extremely 
careless in their handling of very sensitive, highly classified 
information. 
In our system, the prosecutors make the decisions about whether 
charges are appropriate based on evidence we help collect. 
Although we don’t normally make public our recommendations to 
the prosecutors, in this case, given the importance of the matter, I 
think unusual transparency is in order. 
 
decisions to uphold Mr. Trump’s travel ban and in favor of abortion rights 
opponents.”). 
57 In a kind of coda, garlanded with apparently unappreciated irony, Professor 
Akhil Reed Amar has championed Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s nomination for the 
Kennedy seat: 
[W]ith the exception of the current justices and Judge Garland, it is 
hard to name anyone with judicial credentials as strong as those of 
Judge Kavanaugh . . . . 
     . . . . 
     Except for Judge Garland, no one has sent more of his law 
clerks to clerk for the justices of the Supreme Court than Judge 
Kavanaugh has. 
 Akhil Reed Amar, Opinion, A Liberal’s Case for Brett Kavanaugh, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 10, 2018. 
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Although there is evidence of potential violations of the statutes 
regarding the handling of classified information, our judgment is 
that no reasonable prosecutor would bring such a case. 
As a result, although the District Attorney’s office makes final 
decisions on matters like this, we are expressing to the District 
Attorney our view that no charges are appropriate in this case. 
That is essentially what James Comey, Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (“FBI”), said and did at a press conference he called 
on July 5, 2016, a few months before the upcoming presidential 
election.58 Of course, the “subjects of the inquiry” were former 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her colleagues at the 
Department of State. 
Here is some background information. The Department of Justice 
and the FBI began an investigation in July 2015 into former Secretary 
Clinton’s use of a private email server.59 By the spring of 2016, FBI 
Director Comey and his investigators had determined that the evidence 
did not support a criminal prosecution.60 Although a number of 
persons participated in drafting the July 5, 2016 press conference 
statement, Comey himself added the following gloss, just a few days 
in advance; the tone is supremely confident, almost defiant, as if he is 
letting the American people in on a secret that his superiors at the 
Justice Department might not approve of: 
This will be an unusual statement in at least a couple ways. First, I 
am going to include more detail about our process than I ordinarily 
would, because I think the American people deserve those details 
in a case of intense public interest. Second, I have not coordinated 
or reviewed this statement in any way with the Department of 
Justice or any other part of the government. They do not know what 
I am about to say.61 
In fact, his superiors were not pleased. In a subsequent 
investigation of the investigation, conducted by the Justice 
 
58 Press Release, James B. Comey, F.B.I. Dir., Statement on the Investigation of 




59 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF VARIOUS 
ACTIONS BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE IN ADVANCE OF THE 2016 ELECTION 1 (2018) [hereinafter O.I.G. 
REPORT]. 
60 Id. at iii. 
61 Press Release, James B. Comey, supra note 58 (emphasis added). 
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Department’s Office of the Inspector General (“O.I.G. Report”), 
Comey is faulted mainly for two things, the first of which is essentially 
hubris: 
Comey’s decision to make this statement was the result of his 
belief that only he had the ability to credibly and authoritatively 
convey the rationale for the decision to not seek charges against 
Clinton, and that he needed to hold the press conference to protect 
the FBI and the Department from the extraordinary harm that he 
believed would have resulted had he failed to do so.62 
Second, Comey is faulted for violating both the written and unwritten 
rules of the Department of Justice: “Comey’s unilateral announcement 
was inconsistent with Department policy and violated long-standing 
Department practice and protocol by, among other things, criticizing 
Clinton’s uncharged conduct. Comey [also] usurped the authority of 
the Attorney General . . . .”63 
The FBI investigation into Secretary Clinton’s use of a private 
email server took a number of peculiar twists and turns, but a few 
general observations may be ventured. First, the so-called “email 
scandal” was largely a made-up, political controversy.64 There is a 
simple and blindingly obvious explanation for Secretary Clinton’s 
unusual email practices: the personal information-technology available 
to federal government employees (especially in a bureaucracy as vast 
as the State Department) is chronically inferior to that available in the 
private sector.65 This is not an excuse for Secretary Clinton’s 
unsatisfactory solution (the use of a private email server that was not 
continuously monitored),66 but it is an explanation. Reportedly, both 
Director Comey and even President Trump have sometimes failed to 
 
62 O.I.G. REPORT, supra note 59, at vi (emphasis added). 
63 Id. 
64 Cf. LANNY J. DAVIS, THE UNMAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 2016, 7 (2018) 
(discussing Secretary Clinton’s experience with media and Republicans’ feeding 
frenzies during Whitewater). 
65 I can personally attest to this as a former Summer Law Intern at the Department 
of Justice and a Law Clerk to a Federal Appeals Court Judge. For an extended 
period of time, the Department of Justice was pursuing an antitrust case against 
Microsoft Corp. It apparently did not behoove the Justice Department to make 
use of Microsoft programs, products, or software in its offices while pursuing 
this litigation. This could partly explain the limited and outdated choices of 
information technology available in federal agencies over an extended period of 
time. 
66 See Press Release, James B. Comey, supra note 58. 
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use their cumbersome but secure government-issued devices for 
conducting official business.67 So much for consistency. 
The FBI bears approximately the same relationship to the 
Department of Justice as the Police Chief, in my example above, does 
to the District Attorney’s office. It would be just as odd for the Police 
Chief to announce (at his public press conference) that “no reasonable 
prosecutor would bring such a case,” as it was for Director Comey to 
do so in similar circumstances. Neither are prosecutors, reasonable or 
otherwise, so it is odd for them even to be pronouncing on what a 
prosecutor would or would not do. It is as if a defense attorney (in a 
case tried before a judge) were to announce in open court that “No 
reasonable judge would hold against my client.” It would be even 
odder for these statements about “reasonable prosecutors” to be made 
without coordinating with or even informing the prosecutors 
themselves, which Director Comey did not do. According to the O.I.G. 
Report: “Comey acknowledged that he made a conscious decision not 
to tell Department leadership about his plans to make a separate 
statement because he was concerned that they would instruct him not 
to do it.”68 The Report “found that it was extraordinary and 
insubordinate for Comey to do so, and . . . found none of his reasons to 
be a persuasive basis for deviating from well-established Department 
policies . . . .”69 
 
67 See, e.g., Eliana Johnson et al., ‘Too Inconvenient’: Trump Goes Rogue on 
Phone Security, POLITICO (May 21, 2018, 7:00 PM), https://www.politico.com/ 
story/2018/05/21/trump-phone-security-risk-hackers-601903 
[https://perma.cc/FG6H-57FA]. The article reported that: 
President Donald Trump uses a White House cellphone that isn’t 
equipped with sophisticated security features designed to shield his 
communications, according to two senior administration 
officials—a departure from the practice of his predecessors that 
potentially exposes him to hacking or surveillance . . . . Trump 
campaigned in part on his denunciations of Hillary Clinton’s use of 
a private email server as secretary of state—a system that made 
classified information vulnerable to hacking by hostile actors. 
 Id.; see also O.I.G. REPORT, supra note 59, at xii (“[W]e learned during the 
course of our review that Comey, Strzok, and Page used their personal email 
accounts to conduct FBI business.”). 
68 O.I.G. REPORT, supra note 59, at v. I.e., if the answer is likely to be “No,” don’t 
ask. As a small child, I found this defense surprisingly underappreciated. 
69 Id. 
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Saying that Secretary Clinton was “extremely careless”70 with her 
email practices, but not charging her with anything, would be like the 
Police Chief’s pulling someone over for driving “extremely 
recklessly” but not ticketing him. Since Secretary Clinton was a 
leading presidential candidate, Director Comey might also, in all 
fairness (and in the interest of “transparency”), have announced that 
Donald Trump was likewise under investigation for “extremely 
suspicious” evidence of illegal election collusion with the Russian 
government—but that he had not (yet) been charged with anything 
either. Needless to say, those would have been far more serious 
allegations; yet they were never brought up by the FBI (or the Justice 
Department, or the President) in any public forum, at any time before 
the election. So much for fairness (and “transparency”).71 
In a strange way, the July 5, 2016 press conference—unfortunate 
as it was—set off a series of far-reaching reverberations that were to 
have far worse and more profound effects later. The initial reactions 
 
70 Press Release, James B. Comey, supra note 58. 
71 See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., In Trying To Avoid Politics, Comey Shaped an 
Election, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2017, at A1. 
[W]ith polls showing Mrs. Clinton holding a comfortable lead, Mr. 
Comey ended up plunging the F.B.I. into the molten center of a 
bitter election. Fearing the backlash that would come if it were 
revealed after the election that the F.B.I. had been investigating the 
next president and had kept it a secret, Mr. Comey sent a letter 
informing Congress that the case was reopened. 
     What he did not say was that the F.B.I. was also investigating 
the campaign of Donald J. Trump. Just weeks before, Mr. Comey 
had declined to answer a question from Congress about whether 
there was such an investigation. 
     . . . . 
     . . . Mr. Comey’s approach to the two investigations . . . 
[differed] starkly . . . . In the case of Mrs. Clinton, he rewrote the 
script, partly based on the F.B.I.’s expectation that she would win 
and fearing the bureau would be accused of helping her. In the case 
of Mr. Trump, he conducted the investigation by the book, with the 
F.B.I.’s traditional secrecy . . . . 
     Mr. Comey made those decisions with the supreme self-
confidence of a former prosecutor who, in a distinguished career, 
has cultivated a reputation for what supporters see as fierce 
independence, and detractors view as media-savvy arrogance. 
 Id. 
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were bad enough. Legal commentators and the Trump campaign 
seized on the language of “extremely careless,” which came perilously 
close to the statutory, criminal element of “gross negligence.” Mr. 
Trump made the most of this, and chants of “Lock her up!” pervaded 
the remainder of his election campaign. The deeper significance of 
Director Comey’s press conference was not evident until much later, 
when in light of subsequent events it began to represent—in James 
Comey’s mind above all—a mistake that had to be corrected at all 
costs. 
Faced with a complicated series of events, it is always hard to 
single out just those that were truly necessary to the outcome.72 
Theoretically, the list could be infinite.73 Perhaps a butterfly in 
 
72 See, e.g., H. L. A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 40–44 (2d 
ed. 1985) (arguing that, at times, we attempt to trace causes and effects through 
voluntary action and abnormal occurrences to no avail). 
73 On the “Butterfly Effect,” see, for example, Edward N. Lorenz, Deterministic 
Nonperiodic Flow, 20 J. ATMOSPHERIC SCI. 130, 140–41 (1963); Edward N. 
Lorenz, The Predictability of Hydrodynamic Flow, 25 TRANSACTIONS N.Y. 
ACAD. SCI. 409 (1963). In The Predictability of Hydrodynamic Flow, Lorenz 
describes his research: 
     During the course of this investigation we encountered a rather 
striking phenomenon. At various times we found it desirable to 
repeat portions of previous computations. For this purpose we took 
the values which the machine had printed at one particular time 
step, and entered these values into the machine as new initial 
conditions. Sometimes the machine did not repeat its previous 
performance. Fairly soon, small differences between the solutions 
would appear, and these would grow until eventually there was no 
resemblance between the two solutions. 
     The cause of the initial discrepancies was soon evident. The 
numbers had been carried in the machine to six significant figures, 
but only three figures had been printed in the output. The new 
initial values had thus been rounded off to three figures, and we 
were unwittingly superposing a small disturbance upon the earlier 
conditions. In comparing the two solutions, we were observing the 
growth of a small disturbance . . . . 
     . . . . 
     This result had obvious implications for the atmosphere, in 
view of the inevitable inaccuracies of observed initial conditions. It 
suggested that two indistinguishable states could eventually evolve 
into entirely different states, and that a long-range prediction 
would fail completely in at least one instance. 
     . . . . 
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northern Alaska might have noticed an especially bright and appealing 
flower and flapped its wings a little harder to investigate, setting off a 
barely perceptible air current which, when combined in just the right 
way with other, seemingly random currents of air, could contribute to 
an eventual strengthening of the air flow across the entire North 
American continent, across the North Atlantic Ocean, and into the 
Middle East. This theoretically-increased air flow could have a 
decisive effect on tremendous air currents that generally follow a path 
south of the Himalayas, but would now be pushed into the northern 
route, setting off major atmospheric changes worldwide.74 These 
atmospheric conditions could have impacted Arizona in June of 2016, 
where devastating tornados might have crisscrossed the state, such that 
Attorney General Lynch’s airplane—which was heading for Phoenix 
at the time—might have been diverted, and a fateful meeting with 
former President Bill Clinton might never have taken place. 
The butterfly in northern Alaska, however, looked the other way, 
never saw the appealing flower, and the theoretical exercise in 
meteorological conditions did not play out as it might have. The 
weather in Arizona was calm and clear, and former President Clinton 
found his plane on the same tarmac as Attorney General Lynch’s. 
President Clinton saw no reason not to board the Attorney General’s 
plane unexpectedly, for a friendly chat (even as his wife was under 
investigation by the FBI and the Justice Department). For James 
Comey, this incident “tipped the scales” in his decision to hold the 
press conference on his own, without bringing the compromised 
Attorney General into the fold.75 
 
     . . . One meteorologist remarked that if the theory were correct, 
one flap of a sea gull’s wings would be enough to alter the course 
of the weather forever. The controversy has not yet been settled, 
but the most recent evidence seems to favor the sea gulls. 
 Id. at 423–24, 431; see also Ray Bradbury, A Sound of Thunder, COLLIER’S, 
June 28, 1952, at 20, 60. (Could the result of a U.S. presidential election turn on 
what happened to a little butterfly sixty million years ago?). 
74 See, e.g., Judah L. Cohen et al., Arctic Warming, Increasing Snow Cover and 
Widespread Boreal Winter Cooling, 7 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 5, 6 (2012); 
Judah Cohen & Justin Jones, Tropospheric Precursors and Stratospheric 
Warmings, 24 J. CLIMATE 6562, 6562–63, 6570 (2011); Judah Cohen et al., 
Winter 2009–2010: A Case Study of an Extreme Arctic Oscillation Event, 37 
GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 1, 1 (2010); Judah Cohen et al., Decadal 
Fluctuations in Planetary Wave Forcing Modulate Global Warming in Late 
Boreal Winter, 22 J. CLIMATE 4418, 4425 (2009). 
75 See O.I.G. REPORT, supra note 59, at v, 242–43. 
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Another series of “necessary causes” began with the investigation 
of electronic devices used by Secretary Clinton and her senior staff 
aides. In the Clinton investigation—unlike the Trump-Russia 
investigation—Director Comey and his investigators were not looking 
primarily for a “smoking gun.”76 They provisionally accepted 
Secretary Clinton as the hard-working, patriotic, head of an unwieldy, 
far-flung agency who truly believed she could not do her job with the 
information technology provided by the government. (All of her 
predecessors—in the “computer age” at least—came to the same 
conclusion.) The fact that her solution fell short of the governing 
standards presumptively reflected the mens rea not of a treasonous spy 
but of a harried and impatient administrator.77 Thus, the investigators 
were looking primarily for a “pattern of practice.” “They stated that 
they discovered persistent practices of State Department employees, 
including both political and career employees, discussing classified 
information on both unclassified government email accounts and 
personal email accounts, and that this culture predated Clinton’s tenure 
as Secretary of State.”78 Even a representative sample of Secretary 
Clinton’s practices could provide sufficient evidence of her failure to 
follow “best practices.” 
Practical limits were also placed on the scope of the investigation 
from the very beginning: 
[A]t the outset of the investigation, former Deputy Director [Mark 
F.] Giuliano generally advised the team that the purpose of the 
investigation was not to follow every potential lead of classified 
information . . . . Giuliano told the team, “[T]his is not going to 
become some octopus . . . . The focus of the investigation [is] the 
appearance of classified information on [Clinton’s] personal emails 
and that server during the time she was Secretary of 
State.” . . . [T]he FBI’s “purpose and mission” was not to pursue 
“spilled [classified] information to the ends of the earth.”79 
Likewise, “in the beginning of the investigation, the Midyear team 
wanted to obtain every device that touched the server, but . . . over 
 
76 See id. at 324, 368. 
77 See id. at 165–66. 
78 Id. at 95. 
79 Id. at 93 (alterations to internal quotations in original); see also id. at 95 (“I 
think the idea was that, that this investigation had to be somewhat focused, 
otherwise it could spin off into a million different directions. And this 
investigation could take different forms for years and years and years to come. 
So, you know, the, the focus of the investigation was, was really the private 
email system.”). 
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time the team realized that this would not be ‘fruitful.’ . . . OTD 
personnel told the team that ‘it was not likely that there would be 
anything on the devices’ themselves.”80 
Perhaps most significantly, the team of investigators: 
Did not seek to obtain every device, including those of Clinton’s 
senior aides, or the contents of every email account through which 
a classified email may have traversed . . . . [T]he reasons for not 
doing so were based on limitations . . . imposed on the 
investigation’s scope, the desire to complete the investigation well 
before the election, and the belief that the foregone evidence was 
likely of limited value.81 
Thus, for example: 
The Midyear team obtained 2703(d) orders for noncontent 
information in Mills’s Gmail account and Abedin’s Yahoo! 
account and a search warrant for Sullivan’s personal Gmail 
account. However, the Midyear team did not obtain search 
warrants to examine the content of emails in Mills’s or Abedin’s 
private email accounts and did not seek to obtain any of the senior 
aides’ personal devices.82 
Specifically, “the investigators did not seek access to the private 
devices used by Sullivan, Mills, or Abedin during Clinton’s tenure at 
State.”83 
Since the FBI did not systematically round up all electronic 
devices that could possibly have been used by Secretary Clinton’s staff 
to send and receive messages from her, it left itself open and 
vulnerable to the pure workings of chance. Again, perhaps another 
butterfly in northern Alaska might have noticed an especially bright 
and appealing flower and flapped its wings a little harder to 
investigate, setting off a barely perceptible air current which, when 
combined in just the right way with other, seemingly random currents 
of air, could contribute to an eventual strengthening of the air flow 
across the entire North American continent, such that it could have 
 
80 Id. at 94. 
81 Id. at ii (emphasis added). 
82 Id. at 90 (emphasis added); see also id. at 93 (“Generally the witnesses told us 
that they could not remember anyone within the team arguing that more should 
have been done to obtain the senior aides’ devices.”). 
83 Id. at 93; see also id. at 94 (“[T]he Midyear team asked Abedin whether she 
backed up her clintonemail.com emails and she responded that her email was 
‘cloud-based’ and she did not ‘know how to back up her archives.’ . . . [B]ased 
on this testimony, the team assessed that finding helpful evidence on Abedin’s 
devices was unlikely.”). Id. 
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rained every day that week in North Carolina, where after high school, 
a pretty young cheerleader might have been waiting forlornly in the 
rain for a bus, when the captain of the football team pulled up in his 
sports car and offered her a ride home, after which he asked her out on 
a date that weekend, which she gladly accepted, as she already had a 
bit of a crush on him. She might very well have resolved—then and 
there—never again to communicate with “that creep Anthony 
Weiner,” deleted all messages on her computer and phone to and from 
him, and changed her email address and phone number, so that she 
never heard from him again. 
As it was, however, the butterfly in northern Alaska looked the 
other way and never saw the appealing flower. The weather was bright 
and sunny all that week in North Carolina, so the pretty young 
cheerleader walked home from school instead of waiting for the bus, 
and never saw the captain of the football team. That weekend—
without any dates—she had nothing better to do than send and receive 
increasingly explicit computer messages to and from Anthony Weiner, 
who was eventually arrested by the criminal authorities, and whose 
laptop computer was impounded and turned over to the FBI in late 
September, 2016. 
And lo and behold, on that very laptop were hundreds of thousands 
of emails to and from Secretary Clinton and one of her senior aides, 
Huma Abedin, Secretary Clinton’s Deputy Chief of Staff, who 
happened to be Anthony Weiner’s estranged wife, from whom he 
happened to have “inherited” his laptop computer.84  
This should have been no surprise to anyone at the FBI. Since the 
electronic devices of Secretary Clinton’s staff had not all been 
systematically collected and reviewed, it should be no surprise to have 
one turn up later. But this put Director Comey in a particular, self-
inflicted bind. Now he had, not one, but two of his own mistakes to 
correct. 
First was the mistake of assuring the American public that the 
Clinton email investigation was definitively “over and done with,” that 
all relevant evidence had been reviewed and found wanting, and that 
no indictments could possibly come down. That was not necessarily 
true, as Anthony Weiner inadvertently proved. The fact that it could so 
easily be disproved reflected Director Comey’s second mistake. (How 
hard could it have been to round up all electronic devices of Secretary 
Clinton’s staff, including those jointly used by family members?) 
 
84 Id. at 306–07. 
226 UMass Law Review v. 15 | 197 
A standard, one-sentence “Declination of Prosecution” notice from 
the Justice Department would have had none of the broader 
implications that Director Comey’s press conference introduced, 
which would haunt him later. The discovery of additional emails, or 
even an additional device, in the Clinton investigation should not have 
surprised or alarmed anyone, since there had been no effort to round 
up all of those emails and devices anyway, even those of Clinton’s 
senior aides. Indeed, as one prosecutor stated, “the only reason the FBI 
later obtained the Weiner laptop was because ‘it had ended up in our 
laps.’”85 However, Anthony Weiner’s laptop computer then sat 
unexamined for nearly a month in a queue for processing evidence at 
the FBI.86 No one thought it necessary to notify Director Comey. 
Whether the laptop was processed before or after the election was of 
no particular concern.87 
But, for Director Comey, once he found out about the additional, 
hundreds of thousands of emails on October 27, 2016, this 
immediately became a matter of tremendous, self-imposed concern. 
He viewed the American public as going to the polls under false 
pretenses—false pretenses that he himself had wrongly set in place, 
with his assurances at the press conference. Those assurances of 
extraordinary “transparency” and of a definitively closed Clinton email 
investigation were no longer necessarily true (even though, given the 
unsystematic collection of the Clinton emails, the additional emails 
were not considered significant even by Director Comey’s own 
investigators). 
Director Comey’s own, distinctly personal bind, his perceived need 
to set the record—his record—absolutely straight, at all costs (and in 
 
85 Id. at 95. 
86 See id. at vii–viii (The emails were discovered on the laptop on September 26, 
2016, but “no evidence that anyone associated with the Midyear investigation, 
including the entire leadership team at FBI Headquarters, took any action on the 
Weiner laptop issue until the week of October 24.”); see also William Saletan, 
Unread October: The FBI Ignored Anthony Weiner’s Laptop. That May Have 




87 See Saletan, supra note 86; see also O.I.G. REPORT, supra note 59, at 330 (“The 
FBI’s neglect had potentially far-reaching consequences. Comey told the OIG 
that, had he known about the laptop in the beginning of October and thought the 
email review could have been completed before the election, it may have 
affected his decision to notify Congress.”). 
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so doing to correct his own, self-inflicted mistakes), took pre-
cedence—for him—over both the written and unwritten rules of a 
presidential election.88 These self-imposed concerns seemed 
increasingly to have taken on the dimensions—if not the form—of a 
great, white whale for the beleaguered, preoccupied Captain Comey: 
The White Whale swam before him as the monomaniac 
incarnation of all those malicious agencies which some deep men 
feel eating in them, till they are left living on with half a heart and 
half a lung. That intangible malignity which has been from the 
beginning; to whose dominion even the modern Christians ascribe 
one-half of the worlds; which the ancient Ophites of the east 
reverenced in their statue devil;—Ahab did not fall down and 
worship it like them; but deliriously transferring its idea to the 
abhorred white whale, he pitted himself, all mutilated, against it. 
All that most maddens and torments; all that stirs up the lees of 
things; all truth with malice in it; all that cracks the sinews and 
cakes the brain; all the subtle demonisms of life and thought; all 
evil, to crazy Ahab, were visibly personified, and made practically 
assailable in Moby-Dick. He piled upon the whale’s white hump 
the sum of all the general rage and hate felt by his whole race from 
Adam down; and then, as if his chest had been a mortar, he burst 
his hot heart’s shell upon it. 
     . . . But, as in his narrow-flowing monomania, not one jot of 
Ahab’s broad madness had been left behind; so in that broad 
madness, not one jot of his great natural intellect had perished. 
That before living agent, now became the living instrument. If such 
a furious trope may stand, his special lunacy stormed his general 
sanity, and carried it, and turned all its concentred cannon upon its 
own mad mark; so that far from having lost his strength, Ahab, to 
that one end, did now possess a thousandfold more potency than 
 
88 See O.I.G. REPORT, supra note 59, at 372–73. Director Comey’s preoccupation 
with setting the record straight ran counter to the standards of his profession: 
[T]he problem originated with Comey’s elevation of “maximal 
transparency” as a value overriding, for this case only, the 
principles of “stay silent” and “take no action” that the FBI has 
consistently applied to other cases. The Department [of Justice] 
and the FBI do not practice “maximal transparency” in criminal 
investigations. It is not a value reflected in the regulations, 
policies, or customs guiding FBI actions in pending criminal 
investigations. To the contrary, the guidance to agents and 
prosecutors is precisely the opposite—no transparency except in 
rare and exceptional circumstances due to the potential harm to 
both the investigation and to the reputation of anyone under 
investigation. 
 Id. at 373. 
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ever he had sanely brought to bear upon any one reasonable 
object.89 
 
89 HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK 163–65 (Raymond M. Weaver ed., Albert & 
Charles Boni, Inc. 1925) (1851). 
     But be all this as it may, certain it is, that with the mad secret of 
his unabated rage bolted up and keyed in him, Ahab had purposely 
sailed upon the present voyage with the one only and all-
engrossing object of hunting the White Whale . . . . He was intent 
on an audacious, immitigable, and supernatural revenge. 
     Here, then, was this grey-headed, ungodly old man, chasing 
with curses a Job’s whale round the world, at the head of a crew, 
too, chiefly made up of mongrel renegades, and castaways, and 
cannibals . . . . Such a crew, so officered, seemed specially picked 
and packed by some infernal fatality to help him to his 
monomaniac revenge. 
     . . . . 
     . . . For with the charts of all four oceans before him, Ahab was 
threading a maze of currents and eddies, with a view to the more 
certain accomplishment of that monomaniac thought of his soul. 
 Id. at 166, 177. 
Ah, God! what trances of torments does that man endure who is 
consumed with one unachieved revengeful desire. He sleeps with 
clenched hands; and wakes with his own bloody nails in his palms. 
     Often when forced from his hammock by exhausting and 
intolerably vivid dreams of the night, which, resuming his own 
intense thoughts through the day, carried them on amid a clashing 
of phrensies, and whirled them round and round in his blazing 
brain, till the very throbbing of his life-spot became insufferable 
anguish; and when, as was sometimes the case, these spiritual 
throes in him heaved his being up from its base, and a chasm 
seemed opening in him, from which forked flames and lightnings 
shot up, and accursed fiends beckoned him to leap down among 
them; when this hell in himself yawned beneath him, a wild cry 
would be heard through the ship; and with glaring eyes Ahab 
would burst from his state room, as though escaping from a bed 
that was on fire. Yet these, perhaps, instead of being the 
unsuppressible symptoms of some latent weakness, or fright at his 
own resolve, were but the plainest tokens of its intensity. 
 Id. at 180. 
“Oh! thou clear spirit of clear fire, whom on these seas I as Persian 
once did worship, till in the sacramental act so burned by thee, that 
to this hour I bear the scar; I now know thee, thou clear spirit, and I 
now know that thy right worship is defiance . . . . Oh, thou clear 
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On October 28, 2016—over strenuous objections at all levels of 
the Department of Justice—Director Comey notified the majority and 
minority chairmen of all the relevant congressional committees as 
follows: 
     In previous congressional testimony, I referred to the fact that 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had completed its 
investigation of former Secretary Clinton’s personal email server. 
Due to recent developments, I am writing to supplement my 
previous testimony. 
     In connection with an unrelated case, the FBI has learned of the 
existence of emails that appear to be pertinent to the investigation. 
I am writing to inform you that the investigative team briefed me 
on this yesterday, and I agreed that the FBI should take appropriate 
investigative steps designed to allow investigators to review these 
emails to determine whether they contain classified information, as 
well as to assess their importance to our investigation. 
     Although the FBI cannot yet assess whether or not this material 
may be significant, and I cannot predict how long it will take us to 
complete this additional work, I believe it is important to update 
your Committees about our efforts in light of my previous 
testimony.90 
That was eleven days before the election (at the height of early 
voting). 
Director Comey’s notification immediately threw the election into 
complete chaos. An instantly re-energized Mr. Trump gleefully 
 
spirit, of thy fire thou madest me, and like a true child of fire, I 
breathe it back to thee.” 
[Sudden, repeated flashes of lightning . . . .]  
     “ . . . There is some unsuffusing thing beyond thee, thou clear 
spirit, to whom all thy eternity is but time, all thy creativeness 
mechanical. Through thee, thy flaming self, my scorched eyes do 
dimly see it. Oh, thou foundling fire, thou hermit immemorial, thou 
too hast thy incommunicable riddle, thy unparticipated grief. Here 
again with haughty agony, I read my sire. Leap! leap up, and lick 
the sky! I leap with thee; I burn with thee; would fain be welded 
with thee; defyingly I worship thee!” 
 Id. at 447–48 (first and third emphases added). 
90 Letter from James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to Cong. 
Comm. Chairmen (Oct. 28, 2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter Oct. 28 
Letter]. 
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pounced on the new information as “bigger than Watergate,”91 and 
warned against electing a candidate who was clearly about to be 
indicted.92 Double-digit percentage changes in voter sentiment were 
soon detected in both state and national polling.93 
As for Clinton, she viewed the Comey letter to Congress as 
effectively ending her candidacy. It was, as she said later in a 
conference call to donors, simply too much to “overcome.”94 In her 
memoir, she recalls that when she and her aides heard where the new 
emails came from: 
Huma looked stricken. Anthony had already caused so much 
heartache. And now this. 
     “This man is going to be the death of me,” she said, bursting 
into tears. 
     . . . . 
     . . . At the time, the FBI had no idea if the emails were new or 
duplicates of ones already reviewed, or if they were personal or 
work related, let alone whether they might be considered classified 
retroactively or not. They didn’t know anything at all. And Comey 
didn’t wait to learn more. He fired off his letter to Congress two 
days before the FBI received a warrant to look at those emails. 
     Why make a public statement like this, which was bound to be 
politically devastating, when the FBI itself couldn’t say whether 
the new material was important in any way? At the very end of his 
July 5 press conference, Comey had declared sanctimoniously, 
 
91 Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Trump’s Bizarre Claim That the Clinton Email 




92 See Chuck Todd et al., Trump Warned of Endless Clinton Investigations. 
Instead, the Focus Is on Him, NBC NEWS (June 15, 2017, 8:30 AM), https:// 
www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/trump-warned-endless-investigations-
clinton-instead-focus-him-n772736 [https://perma.cc/N9YE-APP5]. 
93 Cf. Nate Cohn, Did Comey Cost Clinton the Election? Why We’ll Never Know, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/upshot/did-
comey-cost-clinton-the-election-why-well-never-know.html 
[https://perma.cc/GUF5-6LQL] (arguing evidence from the polls in October 
2016 remains inconclusive as to the Comey effect on Clinton’s decline in 
support). 
94 Clinton Blames FBI’s Comey for Her Presidential Election Defeat, VOA NEWS 
 (Nov. 12, 2016, 7:23 PM), https://www.voanews.com/usa/us-politics/clinton-
blames-fbis-comey-her-presidential-election-defeat [https://perma.cc/9AX4-
T4YF]. 
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“Only facts matter,” but here the FBI didn’t know the facts and 
didn’t let that stop it from throwing the presidential election into 
chaos.95 
Clinton was right. On the Sunday afternoon two days before 
Election Day (after early voting had mostly ended), Director Comey 
sent a second notification to all the same congressional committee 
chairs and co-chairs, essentially saying “never mind.” 
     I write to supplement my October 28, 2016 letter that notified 
you the FBI would be taking additional investigative steps with 
respect to former Secretary of State Clinton’s use of a personal 
email server. Since my letter, the FBI investigative team has been 
working around the clock to process and review a large volume of 
emails from a device obtained in connection with an unrelated 
criminal investigation. During that process, we reviewed all of the 
communications that were to or from Hillary Clinton while she 
was Secretary of State. 
     Based on our review, we have not changed our conclusions that 
we expressed in July with respect to Secretary Clinton.96 
All the apparently “pertinent” emails on Weiner’s laptop were copies 
or backed-up versions of emails from Abedin’s accounts, which were 
already well known to investigators.97 There was nothing new or 
relevant. But, “[b]y then it was too late,” writes Secretary Clinton. “If 
anything, that second letter may have energized Trump supporters 
even more and made them more likely to turn out and vote against me. 
It also guaranteed that undecided voters saw two more days of 
headlines about emails and investigations.”98 
With his statements and actions, Director Comey violated many of 
the written and unwritten rules of a presidential election. The 
determination of the Justice Department’s Office of the Inspector 
General (“O.I.G.”), that Director Comey’s press conference statement 
“was inconsistent with Department policy and violated long-standing 
Department practice and protocol,” has already been discussed—as 
well as his usurpation of the Attorney General’s authority, which the 
O.I.G. found “extraordinary and insubordinate” and a “deviati[on] 
from well-established Department policies.”99 
 
95 HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, WHAT HAPPENED 314–15 (2017). 
96 Letter from James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to Cong. 
Comm. Chairmen (Nov. 6, 2016) (on file with author). 
97 See Oct. 28 Letter, supra note 90. 
98 CLINTON, supra note 95, at 405. 
99 O.I.G. REPORT, supra note 59, at v, vi. 
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The Department of Justice (of which the FBI is a part) and its 
prosecutors and investigators observe a “quiet period” (of at least sixty 
days) prior to an election, during which sensitive information is not 
publicly released.100 This unwritten rule is presumptively to be 
observed unless there is a very good reason to the contrary. The voting 
public needs time to process and “digest” news, to put it into 
perspective before an election. Emotionally charged, last-minute 
revelations may not fulfill their dire potential when reassessed in the 
cold morning light of counter-arguments and further developments. 
“Quiet” does not mean “cover-up” though, as Deputy Attorney 
General Rod Rosenstein has explained. “When federal agents and 
prosecutors quietly open a criminal investigation, we are not 
concealing anything; we are simply following the longstanding policy 
that we refrain from publicizing non-public information. In that 
context, silence is not concealment.”101 
The timing of FBI Director Comey’s October 28th “surprise” was 
dictated by the actions of a child molester, by his own Bureau’s 
negligence (in sitting on the new evidence for a month), and by his 
own personal promises of extraordinary “transparency.” None of these 
was a good reason for departing from the “quiet period” policy, 
especially considering that no one even knew the nature of the “new” 
evidence. As the O.I.G. Report somewhat delicately put it: 
[W]e found . . . that the Midyear team: 
     . . . . 
     Did not seek to obtain every device, including those of 
Clinton’s senior aides, or the contents of every email account 
through which a classified email may have traversed . . . . We 
further found that [this was], in part, in tension with Comey’s 
response in October 2016 to the discovery of Clinton emails on the 
laptop of Anthony Weiner . . . .102 
Yet Comey might have reasoned to himself: “If I wait two more days 
for a search warrant, that would be only nine days before the election. 
And if I wait two more days to assess the hundreds of thousands of 
 
100 See Josh Meyer, Anticipation Builds Around Mueller as 60-Day Election 
Window Nears, POLITICO (Aug. 30, 2018, 6:54 PM), https:// www.politico.com/ 
story/2018/08/30/mueller-midterms-russia-probe-election-window-805491 
[https://perma.cc/5YW2-VGHX]. 
101 Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to 
the Att’y Gen. 2 (May 9, 2017) (on file with author). 
102 O.I.G. REPORT, supra note 59, at ii (emphasis added). 
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emails, that would be only seven days before the election.” So he 
rolled the dice with what little he knew—only to “unroll” them later, 
two days before the election. 
But as everyone knows, dice cannot really be unrolled any more 
than the genie can be put back into her bottle. Irreparable damage to 
the legitimacy of the election had, quite predictably, already been 
done. 
The Department of Justice, like other federal agencies, is subject to 
applicable provisions of the Hatch Act.103 The very first provision 
states: “(a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (b), an employee 
may take an active part in political management or in political 
campaigns, except an employee may not— 
(1) use his official authority or influence for the purpose of 
interfering with or affecting the result of an election.”104 
One commentator writes that: “the Hatch Act . . . proscribes acting 
with improper ‘purpose’ to influence an election and in engaging in 
certain discrete partisan activities like receiving political contributions. 
It has little direct application here, where there is no evidence 
indicating that Comey acted with any improper purpose.”105 Let’s 
examine that proposition. 
 
103 An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities (Hatch Act), 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–
7326 (2020). 
104 § 7323(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
105 Jane Chong, Pre-Election Disclosures: How Does, and Should, DOJ Analyze 
Edge Cases?, LAWFARE (Nov. 8, 2016, 9:10 AM) (emphasis added), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/pre-election-disclosures-how-does-and-should-
doj-analyze-edge-cases [https://perma.cc/U469-YQE3]; see also David Cole, 
What James Comey Did, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 8, 2016. Cole argues: 
     Whatever else one might say about the just-concluded 2016 
presidential election, one thing is certain: FBI Director James 
Comey played an outsized and exceptionally inappropriate part. 
     . . . . 
     . . . [H]is October 28 announcement dramatically shifted the 
trajectory of the campaign, deflected attention from Donald 
Trump’s own considerable troubles, and inevitably influenced the 
choices of many early voters. 
     . . . . 
     . . . Comey’s October 28 announcement certainly affected the 
results of the 2016 election, but there is no evidence that he took 
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There is no direct evidence that Director Comey intended to 
change the result of the 2016 presidential election. In this context that 
would mean: intervening in the election, intending for the result to 
differ (i.e., for a different candidate to win) from what it would have 
been without the intervention. If that had been Director Comey’s 
“purpose,” he would indeed have been acting with an “improper 
purpose.” But the Hatch Act requires only that he not act “for the 
purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election.”106 So 
the question is not whether Director Comey intended to change the 
result of the 2016 election, but only whether he intended to “affect” 
the result of the election. One can affect the result of an election 
without changing the result, e.g., by voting. 
Director Comey certainly knew that his intervention(s) in the 
election would affect its result. “[A]s any remotely sentient observer 
could have predicted,” writes Jeffrey Toobin, “his interjection created 
a sensation that was damaging to Clinton’s chances.”107 Yet, that still 
speaks only indirectly to Director Comey’s purpose or intent. The 
question might provisionally be put as: Did Director Comey intervene 
in the 2016 election because he knew his intervention would affect the 
result; or did he do so in spite of the fact that his intervention would 
affect the result? According to standard legal doctrine, “A person is 
presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his 
voluntary acts.”108 But a presumption may be rebutted. 
In the ancient legend, Icarus used a pair of improvised wings and 
flew farther and higher than any man had ever done before. This was 
exhilarating; this blinded him. Ultimately, despite all warnings, Icarus 
flew too close to the sun; the wax securing his wings melted; and he 
fell spiraling down into the sea and drowned. 
Likewise, at a parlous and decisive moment in our history, much 
depended on a man already predisposed to soaring flights of 
independence bordering on authoritarianism—for which he had been 
 
his action for that purpose, and absent such a motive, the Hatch 
Act is not implicated. 
Id. (emphasis added). “[I]nevitably,” I take it, carries the further 
connotations of “predictably” and “foreseeably” in this context, which 
bring into play the presumption of intent. 
106 § 7323(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
107 Jeffrey Toobin, Clinton Investigation Mania, Part 2, NEW YORKER, (Nov. 6, 
2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/11/14/clinton-investigation-
mania-part-two [http://perma.cc/KE3S-52QA]. 
108 Presumed Intent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). 
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richly rewarded all his life, with positions of increasing authority and 
discretion. This was exhilarating; this blinded him. So, faced with a 
delicate situation that demanded finely-balanced certainties rather than 
imponderable probabilities, he instead rolled the dice one time too 
many and came crashing down into the perfect chaos his 
miscalculation created for us all. The O.I.G. Report concludes that 
“[as] with his July 5 announcement, [in making this decision to notify 
Congress] Comey engaged in ad hoc decisionmaking based on his 
personal views even if it meant rejecting longstanding Department 
policy or practice . . . . [T]he burden was on him to justify an 
extraordinary departure from these established norms, policies, and 
precedent.”109 
Burden-shifting is what presumptions are all about: the burden of 
proof and the burden of producing evidence.110 Director Comey was 
ultimately laboring under the burdens of two presumptions: (1) the 
presumption that he intended to “affect” if not change the result of the 
2016 election (which would have been “the natural and probable 
consequence of his voluntary acts”111)—in notifying Congress as he 
did; and (2) the presumption that the established norms, policies, and 
precedent of the Department of Justice should be followed. Rebutting 
these two presumptions would not be easy even under the best of 
circumstances. 
In his memoir, Director Comey gives his most considered defense. 
He begins in a confessional tone: “I have many [flaws] . . . . I can be 
stubborn, prideful, overconfident, and driven by ego. I’ve struggled 
with those my whole life.”112 This is like the question in the job 
interview when the interviewer asks what your “greatest weakness” is. 
You are supposed to say something like: “Well, sometimes I probably 
work too hard at my job.” So, Director Comey’s “flaws,” reported sua 
sponte, may be assumed to be underestimated. In fact, 200 pages later, 
he is still “struggling” with his ego and his pride: “I have long worried 
about my ego . . . . [T]here is danger that all that pride can make me 
blind . . .” (like Icarus).113 
Director Comey’s main defense is as follows: 
 
109 O.I.G. REPORT, supra note 59, at 371, 372. 
110 See Charles W. Collier, The Improper Use of Presumptions in Recent Criminal 
Law Adjudication, 38 STAN. L. REV. 423, 423 n.1 (1986). 
111 Presumed Intent, supra note 108. 
112 JAMES COMEY, A HIGHER LOYALTY, at x (2018). 
113 Id. at 206. 
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I had assumed from media polling that Hillary Clinton was going 
to win. I have asked myself many times since if I was influenced 
by that assumption. I don’t know. Certainly not consciously, but I 
would be a fool to say it couldn’t have had an impact on me. It is 
entirely possible that, because I was making decisions in an 
environment where Hillary Clinton was sure to be the next 
president, my concern about making her an illegitimate president 
by concealing the restarted investigation bore greater weight than it 
would have if the election appeared closer or if Donald Trump 
were ahead in all polls. But I don’t know.114 
If you point a loaded gun at my heart and pull the trigger, you are 
presumed to want me dead, even if I survive. Charges of “assault with 
a deadly weapon, attempted murder, etc.” will still lie, even if you 
claim: “I was just attempting a citizen’s arrest. I thought he was 
jaywalking, and I didn’t want him to get away.” (And if I die within a 
year and a day, the charges are raised to murder at the common law.) 
Director Comey figuratively pointed a loaded gun at the heart of 
the Clinton campaign and pulled the trigger. He knew this would 
“affect” the result of the election. Again, “as any remotely sentient 
observer could have predicted, his interjection created a sensation that 
was damaging to Clinton’s chances.”115 Director Comey also knew his 
interjection might possibly even change the result of the election, such 
that Mr. Trump would win. That was a chance he was willing to take. 
But that was not a chance he was lawfully authorized to take. 
Nowhere in the job description of FBI Director does it say that he 
is “personally authorized and empowered to assure the ‘legitimacy’ (as 
he sees it) of our elected Presidents—even if that means influencing 
the results of elections and departing from the established norms, 
policies, and precedent of the Department of Justice.” Nevertheless, 
this was Director Comey’s justification to himself, as he intentionally 
“affected” the result of the election and also knowingly took the 
chance that he might possibly even change the result altogether. His 
actions and statements thus fall well within the provision of the Hatch 
Act prohibiting a federal employee from “us[ing] his official authority 
or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result 
of an election.”116 Director Comey’s considered “defense” does 
nothing to rebut either of the two presumptions he was subject to. 
 
114 Id. at 204 (emphasis added). 
115 Toobin, Clinton Investigation Mania, Part 2, supra note 107. 
116 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(1) (2020). 
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In a lengthy article entitled The Comey Letter Probably Cost 
Clinton the Election, acclaimed pollster and statistician Nate Silver 
concludes: 
     Hillary Clinton would probably be president if FBI Director 
James Comey had not sent a letter to Congress on Oct. 28. The 
letter . . . upended the news cycle and soon halved Clinton’s lead in 
the polls, imperiling her position in the Electoral College. 
The letter isn’t the only reason that Clinton lost. It does not excuse 
every decision the Clinton campaign made . . . . 
But . . . [t]he impact of Comey’s letter is comparatively easy to 
quantify, by contrast . . . . At a minimum, its impact might have 
been only a percentage point or so. Still, because Clinton lost 
Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin by less than 1 point, the 
letter was probably enough to change the outcome of the Electoral 
College. 
     . . . . 
     So while one can debate the magnitude of the effect, there’s a 
reasonably clear consensus of the evidence that the Comey letter 
mattered—probably by enough to swing the election. This ought 
not be one of the more controversial facts about the 2016 
campaign; the data is pretty straightforward.117 
 
117 Nate Silver, The Comey Letter Probably Cost Clinton the Election, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 3, 2017) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-comey-letter-probably-cost-clinton-the-
election/ [https://perma.cc/57ED-GZA5]; see also Kevin Drum, Let’s Talk 
About Bubbles and James Comey, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 22, 2017), 
https://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2017/04/lets-talk-about-bubbles-and-
james-comey/ [https://perma.cc/64SQ-RUDW]. 
[T]he Comey effect was real, it was big, and it probably cost 
Clinton the election. 
     . . . . 
     . . . Comey’s letter is unique for a few reasons. First, it was an 
intervention by an institution that Americans have largely 
perceived as nonpartisan. (Indeed, the FBI actively works to foster 
that image.) Second, the intervention was almost perfectly timed to 
impact Clinton at the worst time—dominating the final week of 
campaigning as an unusually large number of undecided voters 
made up their minds. Finally, it aligned perfectly with the narrative 
pushed by Trump—and bolstered by the media’s obsessive 
coverage of how Clinton handled her State Department email, and 
the slow-drip release of hacked emails—that Clinton was somehow 
fundamentally corrupt. 
     . . . . 
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“Perhaps the truest explanation of why things happened as they did is 
the most ordinary,” writes James Fallows in another context: “that 
human beings could not foresee the way that chance and circumstance 
could magnify the consequences of their acts.”118 
Ironically, the “aura of illegitimacy” that so concerned Director 
Comey did, in fact, materialize; it simply enveloped a different 
candidate. And it happened, not despite Director Comey’s best efforts, 
but precisely because of them. 
 
     The effect of Comey’s late intervention into the election is also 
clear in the national polls. As neuroscientist Sam Wang showed, 
Clinton’s margin over Trump falls dramatically in national polls 
directly after the Comey letter and never recovers. At the time, 
statistician Nate Silver noted that the Comey letter coincided with 
“a swing of about 3 points against her”—a massive swing in a tight 
election. These public polls are supported by internal polling from 
both campaigns suggesting that Comey was a massive blow to 
Clinton at a pivotal moment in the election. 
     . . . . 
     It’s true that there are other possible explanations for a late shift 
in vote intentions, but thus far there is no alternative explanation of 
merit. (The cyberhacks were surely important, but their effects 
would have been felt more steadily throughout the campaign.) 
     Instead, the evidence is clear, and consistent, regarding the 
Comey effect. The timing of the shift both at the state and national 
levels lines up very neatly with the publication of the letter, as does 
the predominance of the story in the media coverage from the final 
week of the campaign. With an unusually large number of 
undecided voters late in the campaign, the letter hugely increased 
the salience of what was the defining critique of Clinton during the 
campaign at its most critical moment. 
     . . . . 
     . . . Comey broke a decades-long norm of not intervening in 
presidential elections. The fact that his interference alone almost 
certainly swayed an election is indicative of a broader and 
disturbing breakdown of political norms. 
 Sean McElwee et al., 4 Pieces of Evidence Showing FBI Director James Comey 
Cost Clinton the Election, VOX (Jan. 11, 2017, 9:40 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/1/11/14215930/comey-email-election-
clinton-campaign [https://perma.cc/5AZ5-6UU9]. 
118 James Fallows, M-16: A Bureaucratic Horror Story, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 
1981, at 56, 65. 
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II. THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 
 [T]hey told me I was everything. ‘Tis a lie. 
      King Lear119 
A. Present at the Destruction 
Out of the rubble and ashes of World War II emerged a new world 
order, and a new appreciation of the role played by psychological 
factors in the social and political process. Former U.S. Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson entitled his postwar memoir Present at the 
Creation, as a metaphor for the task of reconstruction at war’s end, 
which was “just a bit less formidable than that described in the first 
chapter of Genesis. That was to create a world out of chaos; ours, to 
create half a world, a free half, out of the same material without 
blowing the whole to pieces in the process.”120 But how had so much 
been reduced to rubble and ashes in the first place? 
Many years earlier, in Munich, an unknown man of no 
consequence arose at five o’clock in the morning. He had “gotten into 
the habit of throwing pieces of bread or hard crusts to the little mice 
which spent their time in the small room, and then to watch these droll 
little animals romp and scuffle for these few delicacies.”121 For him, 
watching the mice fight over bread crumbs was more than a sadistic 
amusement. It was the Darwinian “struggle for existence,” playing out 
on a small scale. 
For the young Hitler, this formative experience helped to 
rationalize and justify his overweening desire for power: it was 
natural, rooted in the eternal laws of nature, and specifically in the 
need for self-preservation—the primary motive of human behavior. 
Even at this early stage, some of the defining features of the 
authoritarian “world-view” may be discerned: 
[T]he authoritarian person lives in a world which may be 
conceived . . . as a sort of jungle in which man’s hand is 
necessarily against every other man’s, in which the whole world is 
conceived of as dangerous, threatening, or at least challenging, and 
in which human beings are conceived of as primarily selfish or evil 
or stupid. To carry the analogy further, this jungle is peopled with 
animals who either eat or are eaten, who are either to be feared or 
 
119 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 4, sc. 6. 
120 DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION, at xvii (1970). 
121 ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 295 (Reynal & Hitchcock trans., Houghton 
Mifflin Co. 1939) (1925). 
240 UMass Law Review v. 15 | 197 
despised. One’s safety lies in one’s own strength and this strength 
consists primarily in the power to dominate.122 
In Erich Fromm’s analysis, this “struggle for existence” was 
moderated and channeled into a stable social order by the “natural” 
bonds and roles of medieval society—family, trade, guild, religion, 
community.123 At the same time, “psychological factors play [an] 
active [role] in the social process[.]”124 The traditional “identity with 
nature, clan, religion, gives the individual security. He belongs to . . . a 
structuralized whole in which he has an unquestionable place.”125 (In 
this traditional social ordering, a mere real estate developer—lacking 
any experience in government, politics, academia, or the military—
could hardly aspire to become President.) But all this changed with the 
transition from the “golden age” of Gemeinschaft (community) to the 
not-so-golden age of Gesellschaft (society).126 
The medieval social system was destroyed and with it the stability 
and relative security it had offered the individual. Now with the 
beginning of capitalism all classes of society started to move. 
There ceased to be a fixed place in the economic order which could 
be considered a natural, an unquestionable one. The individual was 
left alone; everything depended on his own effort, not on the 
security of his traditional status.127 
In the new economic order: 
 
122 A. H. Maslow, The Authoritarian Character Structure, 18 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 401, 
402–03 (1943). “If one is not strong enough the only alternative is to find a 
strong protector. If this protector is strong enough and can be relied upon, then 
peace of a certain sort is possible to the individual.” Id. at 403. A recent 
commentator has reached similar conclusions about the world-view of President 
Donald Trump: “Magnanimity, fair dealing, example setting, win-win solutions, 
a city set upon a hill: All this, in the president’s mind, is a sucker’s game, 
obscuring the dog-eat-dog realities of life. Among other distinctions, Mr. Trump 
may be our first Hobbesian president.” Bret Stephens, Opinion, The Thomas 
Hobbes Presidency: Conservatives Were Outraged by Obama’s Apologies. 
What About Trump’s Slander?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2017, 6:14 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-thomas-hobbes-presidency-1486426412 
[https://perma.cc/2KRQ-F6VM]. 
123 See ERICH H. FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM 5–6 (First Owl Book ed. 1994) 
(1941). 
124 Id. at 5. 
125 Id. at 34. 
126 See generally FERDINAND TÖNNIES, GEMEINSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT 
(1887). 
127 FROMM, supra note 123, at 59. 
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[T]he unpredictable laws of the market decided whether [one’s] 
products could be sold at all and at what profit . . . . 
     . . . Each individual must go ahead and try his luck. He had to 
swim or to sink. Others were not allied with him in a common 
enterprise, they became competitors, and often he was confronted 
with the choice of destroying them or being destroyed.128 
Yet this new economic individuation also offered freedom from the 
static, unchanging bonds, roles, and limits of traditional society. Now 
an undistinguished real estate developer—a very, very wealthy real 
estate developer—could indeed aspire to become President. The sky 
was the limit, but it is lonely at the top. “They were more free, but they 
were also more alone.”129 Security and community were traded for the 
fruits of ambition and the chance for fame. And the masses? 
The masses who did not share the wealth and power of the ruling 
group had lost the security of their former status and had become a 
shapeless mass, to be flattered or to be threatened—but always to 
be manipulated and exploited by those in power. A new despotism 
arose side by side with the new individualism.130 
In this setting the appeal of authoritarianism makes perfect sense. 
The dominating leader promises a way to overcome the unbearable 
feeling of powerlessness: by “becom[ing] a part of a bigger and more 
powerful whole outside of oneself, to submerge and participate in 
it . . . . By becoming part of a power which is felt as unshakably 
strong, eternal, and glamorous, one participates in its strength and 
glory.”131 This same dynamic (or dialectic) applies to the leader as 
well: “the ‘authoritarian character[]’ . . . admires authority and tends 
to submit to it, but at the same time he wants to be an authority himself 
and have others submit to him.”132 As Abraham Maslow puts it, in 
psychological terms: 
 
128 Id. at 60–61; see also id. at 99 (“The breakdown of the medieval system of 
feudal society had one main significance for all classes of society: the individual 
was left alone and isolated. He was free. This freedom had a twofold result. Man 
was deprived of the security he had enjoyed, of the unquestionable feeling of 
belonging, and he was torn loose from the world which had satisfied his quest 
for security both economically and spiritually. He felt alone and anxious. But he 
was also free to act and to think independently, to become his own master and 
do with his life as he could—not as he was told to do.”). 
129 Id. at 47. 
130 Id. at 46. 
131 Id. at 154. 
132 Id. at 162. 
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Every authoritarian character is both sadistic and masochistic. 
Which tendency will appear depends largely (but not entirely) on 
the situation. If he is in dominance status, he will tend to be cruel; 
if he is in subordinate status, he will tend to be masochistic. But 
because of these tendencies in himself, he will understand, and 
deep down within himself will agree with the cruelty of the 
superior person, even if he himself is the object of the cruelty.133 
This analysis has clear implications for the clear and present dangers 
of our time. 
“America’s child president,” writes a conservative commentator 
(George Will in the Washington Post): 
[H]as a weak man’s banal fascination with strong men whose 
disdain for him is evidently unimaginable to him. And, yes, he 
only perfunctorily pretends to have priorities beyond personal 
aggrandizement. But just as astronomers inferred, from anomalies 
in the orbits of the planet Uranus, the existence of Neptune before 
actually seeing it, [Special Counsel] Mueller might infer, and then 
find, still-hidden sources of the behavior of this sad, embarrassing 
wreck of a man.134 
Or, from the liberal side (Bruce Shapiro in The Nation): 
The political brutality of the Trump era is rooted in the Rehnquist 
right’s decades-long campaign to undo the modern American 
social contract—New Deal business regulations, civil rights, 
environmental protections, and sexual equality—and to restore 
executive power to the days before civil-liberties-minded judges 
and a post-Watergate Congress reined it in.135 
Or, finally, from what might be termed the British expatriate 
perspective (Andrew Sullivan in New York Magazine): 
     This is not treason as such. It is not an attack on America, but 
on a version of America, the liberal democratic one . . . . It is an 
attack on those institutions that Trump believes hurt America—like 
NATO and NAFTA and the E.U. It is a championing of an illiberal 
America, and a partnering with autocrats in a replay of old-school 
Great Power zero-sum politics, in which the strong pummel and 
 
133 Maslow, supra note 122, at 408 (“He will understand the bootlicker and the 
slave even if he himself is not the bootlicker or the slave.”). 
134 George F. Will, Opinion, This Sad, Embarrassing Wreck of a Man, WASH. POST 
(July 17, 2018, 2:57 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/this-sad-
embarrassing-wreck-of-a-man/2018/07/17/d06de8ea-89e8-11e8-a345-
a1bf7847b375_story.html [https://perma.cc/BQT3-F54P]. 
135 Bruce Shapiro, Keeping Kavanaugh Off the Supreme Court, NATION (July 18, 
2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/keeping-kavanaugh-off-supremecourt/ 
[https://perma.cc/98UB-S5BJ]. 
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exploit the weak. Trump is simultaneously vandalizing the West, 
while slowly building a strongman alliance that rejects every single 
Western value. And Russia—authoritarian, ethnically homo-
geneous, internally brutal, internationally rogue—is at its center.136 
In 1965, Erich Fromm wrote that “[t]he United States has shown 
itself resistant against all totalitarian attempts to gain influence.”137 
Would he write the same thing today?138 
 
B. The Narcissist-in-Chief 
     As adults, we have forgotten most of our childhood, not only its 
contents but its flavor; as men of the world, we hardly know of the 
existence of the inner world . . . . Our capacity to think, except in 
the service of what we are dangerously deluded in supposing is our 
self-interest and in conformity with common sense, is pitifully 
limited: our capacity even to see, hear, touch, taste and smell is so 
shrouded in veils of mystification that an intensive discipline of 
unlearning is necessary for anyone . . . .139 
Under the U.S. Constitution, no one can become President who has 
not “attained to the Age of thirty five Years.”140 Does this ensure that 
American Presidents will be mature enough—mentally, intellectually, 
morally, emotionally—for the job? This question began receiving the 
attention it deserved at about the same time as Donald Trump started 
ascending the presidential opinion polls. 
“Honestly, I don’t think people change that much,” says Mr. 
Trump himself.141 “When I look at myself in the first grade and I look 
 
136 Andrew Sullivan, Why Trump Has Such a Soft Spot for Russia, N.Y. MAG.: THE 
INTELLIGENCER (July 20, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/07/ 
andrew-sullivan-why-trump-has-such-a-soft-spot-for-russia.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z96Q-LUZN]. 
137 FROMM, supra note 123, at xv. 
138 See generally, e.g., MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, FASCISM: A WARNING 4 (2018) 
(“Why . . . is democracy now ‘under assault and in retreat?’ Why are many 
people in positions of power seeking to undermine public confidence in 
elections, the courts, the media, and—on the fundamental question of earth’s 
future—science ? . . . And why, this far into the twenty-first century, are we 
once again talking about Fascism?”). 
139 R. D. LAING, THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE 10–11 (1967). 
140 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
141 Maureen Dowd, Opinion, Introducing Donald Trump, Diplomat, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 16, 2015, at SR9. 
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at myself now, I’m basically the same.”142 Distinguished anthro-
pologist James Harvey Robinson states for the record: 
[A]ccumulating evidence seems to indicate that when bodily 
maturity is once reached, the increase of knowledge and 
intelligence slackens or even almost ceases in many cases. By 13 
or 14 the child has acquired an overwhelming part of the 
knowledge, impressions, cautions and general estimates of his 
fellow creatures and the world in which he lives, which he 
continues to harbour with slight modifications during his 
lifetime . . . . 
     . . . We have had time before 13 to take over the standardized 
sentiments of our elders, to learn all that they know, to accept their 
views of religion, politics, manners, general proprieties and 
respectabilities.143 
This developmental paradigm has recently received highly instructive, 
first-hand confirmation from General James N. Mattis, who served as 
President Trump’s Secretary of Defense: 
     It seemed Mattis and others were at the end of their rope with 
the president. How are you possibly questioning these things that 
are obvious and so fundamental? It was as if Mattis were saying, 
God, stop it! 
     . . . . 
     The president left. Among the principals there was exasperation 
with these questions. Why are we having to do this constantly? 
When is he going to learn? They couldn’t believe they were having 
these conversations and had to justify their reasoning. Mattis was 
particularly exasperated and alarmed, telling close associates that 
the president acted like—and had the understanding of—“a fifth or 
sixth grader.”144 
That would put Mr. Trump at the intellectual level of a ten to twelve-
year-old—a bit at the low end of Robinson’s developmental model, 
 
142 MICHAEL D’ANTONIO, NEVER ENOUGH 40 (2015) (emphasis added). Translated 
into age-brackets, Trump is essentially saying: “I’m basically the same now as I 
was at age six.” 
143 James Harvey Robinson, Civilization, in 5 Encyclopædia Britannica 735, 739 
(14th ed. 1929). Professor Robinson based these conclusions partly on millions 
of intelligence tests administered by the military. 
144 BOB WOODWARD, FEAR: TRUMP IN THE WHITE HOUSE 306, 307–08 (2018); cf. 
Jack Healy et al., ‘Our Country Is Being Run by Children’: Shutdown’s End 
Brings Relief and Frustration, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/25/us/shutdown-federal-workers-
reaction.html [https://perma.cc/49J4-VAT7]. 
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but otherwise generally consistent with it. Thus, when Senator Rand 
Paul points to “a sophomoric quality that is entertaining about Mr. 
Trump,” and asks: “My goodness, that happened in junior high. Are 
we not way above that?”145—the answer must be, “No, we are not.” 
How could we be? 
According to a standard manual of mental disorders, a clinically 
significant personality disorder can generally be traced back to 
adolescence or at least early adulthood. It forms “an enduring pattern 
of thinking, feeling, and behaving that is relatively stable over 
time”146—which fits in well with Trump’s claims that “I’m a solid, 
stable person” and that, anyway, “people [don’t] change that much.”147 
The extreme manifestation of this phenomenon would be Peter Pan, 
the boy who never grew up at all: 
     The difference between him and the other boys . . . was that 
they knew it was make-believe, while to him make-believe and 
true were exactly the same thing. This sometimes troubled them, as 
when they had to make-believe that they had had their dinners. 
     . . . . 
     . . . Peter would not budge. He was tingling with life and also 
top-heavy with conceit. “Am I not a wonder, oh, I am a wonder!” 
he whispered . . . . 
     . . . . 
     Peter was not quite like other boys; but he was afraid at last. A 
tremor ran through him, like a shudder passing over the sea; but on 
the sea one shudder follows another till there are hundreds of them, 
and Peter felt just the one. Next moment he was standing erect on 
the rock again, with that smile on his face and a drum beating 
within him. It was saying, “To die will be an awfully big 
adventure.”148 
Peter Pan appears to be suffering from a number of serious mental 
disorders. Even so, “overweening ambition and confidence may lead 
 
145 Frank Bruni, Opinion, An Overdose of Donald Trump at the G.O.P. Debate, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/17/opinion/an-
overdose-of-donald-trump-republican-gop-debate.html [https://perma.cc/87GM-
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146 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 647 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]. 
147 Dowd, supra note 141. 
148 J. M. BARRIE, PETER PAN 61, 77, 84 (Jack Zipes ed., Penguin Books 2004) 
(1911). 
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to high achievement,”149 as the diagnostic guidelines concede and as 
the example of Donald Trump confirms. (Such people tend to have 
biographies written about them with titles like Never Enough; 
according to George Will, they also tend to “nurs[e] . . . innumerable 
delusions.”)150 Several standard psychology textbooks feature Trump 
as an example, one of which states: 
Mr. Trump’s image is exemplary of the culture of narcissism: he 
refers to himself in the third person as “The Donald” and is 
primarily well known as the developer whose name must appear on 
each edifice and on his array of highly publicized marriages, 
divorces, and prenuptial agreements. He is the sole purveyor of 
winning and losing.151 
Within the mental health disciplines, narcissism is understood as a 
normal and healthy stage of childhood development and psychological 
growth. “In healthy development,” writes one analyst, “the child’s 
normal initial sense of grandiosity (‘when I cry, milk is produced’) is 
gradually modified and transformed into energy, ambition, and self-
esteem.”152 By contrast, however, arrested development of these 
attributes may lead to narcissistic personality disorder.153 An adult 
with this disorder: 
 
149 DSM-5, supra note 146, at 671 (discussing “associated features supporting 
diagnosis” of narcissistic personality disorder). 
150 George F. Will, Opinion, Donald Trump is a Counterfeit Republican, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-counterfeit-
republican/2015/08/12/c28c2968-4052-11e5-bfe3-ff1d8549bfd2_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/K33T-KZEM] (“In every town large enough to have two 
traffic lights there is a bar at the back of which sits the local Donald Trump, 
nursing his fifth beer and innumerable delusions.”); see D’ANTONIO, supra note 
142. 
151 Jerrold Lee Shapiro & Susan Bernadett-Shapiro, Narcissism: Greek Tragedy, 
Psychological Syndrome, Cultural Norm, in 1 MENTAL DISORDERS OF THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM 25, 38 (Thomas G. Plante ed., 2006). 
152 Id. at 31. “[A]ll theorists who address this syndrome agree that narcissism is a 
healthy and appropriate stage of childhood development.” Id. at 30. 
153 See Joan Acocella, Selfie: How Big a Problem Is Narcissism?, NEW YORKER, 
May 12, 2014 (book review). 
In the DSM, narcissism is one of the so-called “personality 
disorders,” a category different from neuroses . . . . Neuroses are 
afflictions of the “worried well.” At a certain point in these 
people’s lives, things become hard for them. They wake up in the 
middle of the night; they’re swamped with dread; they don’t know 
why. A personality disorder, by contrast, doesn’t seem to start or to 
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1. Has a grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g., exaggerates 
achievements and talents, expects to be recognized as superior 
without commensurate achievements). 
     . . . . 
4. Requires excessive admiration. 
     . . . . 
9. Shows arrogant, haughty behaviors or attitudes. 
     . . . . 
     Vulnerability in self-esteem makes individuals with narcissistic 
personality disorder very sensitive to “injury” from criticism or 
defeat . . . . They may react with disdain, rage, or defiant 
counterattack.154 
 
go away. The person’s family will often report that he’s always 
been like that. Furthermore, he thinks that he is perfectly all right. 
 Id. 
154 DSM-5, supra note 146, at 669–71. Additionally, “[i]ndividuals with this 
disorder . . . may be preoccupied with how well they are doing and how 
favorably they are regarded by others.” Id. at 670. See George T. Conway III, 
Unfit for Office: Donald Trump’s Narcissism Makes It Impossible for Him to 
Carry Out the Duties of the Presidency in the Way the Constitution Requires, 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/ 
george-conway-trump-unfit-office/599128/ [https://perma.cc/8ZT8-8S3H]; see 
also Mark Leibovich, Donald Trump is Not Going Anywhere, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Oct. 4, 2015, at 28 32–33. “I observed to Trump that I had never encountered a 
candidate who talked so much to me about the latest polls. He knew precisely 
why that was. ‘That’s because they’re not leading,’ he said.” Id. at 52. The 
article continues: 
     Trump makes no attempt to cloak his love of fame and, 
admirably, will not traffic in that tiresome politicians’ notion that 
his campaign is “not about me, it’s about you.” The ease with 
which Trump exhibits, and inhabits, his self-regard is not only 
central to his “brand” but also highlights a kind of honesty about 
him . . . . 
     . . . . 
     . . . I, too, have grown exceedingly weary of this world—the 
familiar faces, recycled tropes and politics as usual—and here was 
none other than Donald J. Trump, the billionaire blowhard whom I 
had resisted as a cartoonish demagogue, defiling it with 
resonance . . . . 
     . . . . 
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(“I hope they attack me,” says Trump, “because everybody who 
attacks me is doomed.”155) 
When his beloved Wendy falls into a frightful faint, Peter Pan 
springs boldly into action. Instead of moving her (which “would not be 
sufficiently respectful”) he decrees that a whole new house should be 
built right around her—on the spot.156 None of the other boys objects; 
indeed, “[t]hey were all delighted” with such a grand idea, and soon 
“they were as busy as tailors the night before a wedding.”157 
Afterwards, Peter Pan inspects the finished house and notes only that it 
lacks a chimney and a knocker on the door, both of which are quickly 
supplied.158 
Likewise, none of Donald Trump’s stated policy prescriptions 
seems at all beyond the appreciation of an average teenager. Indeed, 
they verge on the blindingly obvious.159 Illegal immigrants? “Build a 
wall. A Great Wall. A very long and costly wall. And make those dirty 
banditos pay for it! (Somehow.)”160 
 
     . . . Was Trump the logical byproduct of a cancerous system in 
which American democracy has mutated into a gold rush of cheap 
celebrity, wealth creation and narcissistic branding madness? Or 
has he merely wielded the tools of this transformation—his money, 
celebrity and dominance of the media—against the forces that have 
engendered this disgust in the system to begin with? 
 Id. 32–33. 
155 Monica Langley, Donald Trump’s One-Man Roadshow: GOP Hopeful Soars 
Amid Rivals’ Hostility; ‘Everybody Who Attacks Me Is Doomed,’ WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 14, 2015, at A1. 
156 BARRIE, supra note 148, at 60. 
157 Id.; cf. id. at 88 (“Peter thought it his due, and he would answer condescend-
ingly, ‘It is good. Peter Pan has spoken.’”). 
158 Id. at 63. 
159 Cf. WILHELM REICH, THE MASS PSYCHOLOGY OF FASCISM 83 (Vincent R. 
Carfagno trans., 3d ed. 1970) (“Hitler repeatedly stressed that one could not get 
at the masses with arguments, proofs, and knowledge, but only with feelings and 
beliefs. In the language of National Socialism . . . the nebulous and the mystical 
are . . . conspicuous . . . .”). 
160 See Immigration Reform That Will Make America Great Again, TRUMP: MAKE 
AM. GREAT AGAIN!, https://meitar.github.io/radical-leftists-for-trump/ 
www.donaldjtrump.com/positions/immigration-reform [https://perma.cc/TW6R-
K9PA]. The website proclaims: 
1. A nation without borders is not a nation. There must be a wall 
across the southern border. 
     . . . . 
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Mr. Trump offers—as one commentator puts it—“a simpler and 
more appealing narrative than the realities of the current global 
economy.”161 It is probably no accident that his campaign slogan 
(“Make America Great Again!”) is not something like “America—
Whistling Past the Graveyard?” or even “America, Just Do It.” (Mr. 
Trump, ever the enterprising businessman, has actually trademarked 
“Make America Great Again!” and warned other candidates against 
using the phrase for “promoting public awareness of political issues” 
or “fundraising in the field of politics.”162 So, be careful what you say 
about America. Be very careful.) 
Of course, a teenage politician’s target audience would be his 
fellow teenagers. And none of their commonly stated “reasons” for 
supporting Mr. Trump seems beyond the intellectual range of a 
teenager either. (“When he gets in there,” said one, “he’ll figure it 
out.”163 Somehow.) 
 
     For many years, Mexico’s leaders have been taking advantage 
of the United States by using illegal immigration to export the 
crime and poverty in their own country (as well as in other Latin 
American countries). 
     . . . . 
     . . . They are responsible for this problem, and they must help 
pay to clean it up. 
     . . . . 
     Mexico must pay for the wall . . . . We will not be taken 
advantage of anymore. 
 Id. 
161 Brendan Nyhan, Donald Trump, the Green Lantern Candidate, UPSHOT (New 
York Times) (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/26/upshot/ 
donald-trump-the-green-lantern-candidate.html?searchResultPosition=1 
[https://perma.cc/84EP-CJQJ]. 
162 See MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN, Registration No. 4,773,272. In 
connection with the filing of the trademark, Mr. Trump’s attorney explained 
that, “[t]he issue is not whether it is being used verbally by others in public. The 
problem is that it is repeatedly being used by others as a slogan or catchphrase. 
That is what the trademark filing protects against.” David Martosko, Trump 
Trademarked Slogan ‘Make America Great Again,’ DAILYMAIL.COM (May 12, 
2015, 12:04 PM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3077773/Trump-
trademarked-slogan-Make-America-Great-just-DAYS-2012-election-says-Ted-
Cruz-agreed-not-use-Scott-Walker-booms-TWICE-speech.html 
[https://perma.cc/R2RF-LG6A] (last updated May 13, 2015, 12:28 AM). 
163 Alan Blinder, Trump Fails to Fill Alabama Stadium, but Fans’ Zeal Is Hardly 
Diminished, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2015, at A11. Although Mr. Trump has 
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“I play to people’s fantasies,” Mr. Trump once wrote in explaining 
his alleged business acumen. “I call it truthful hyperbole.”164 This 
approach seems to resonate particularly well with youthful audiences: 
Mr. Trump offered a speech of less than a minute on the state 
party’s stage. But that was beside the point, as star-struck 
supporters greeted him like a stadium rocker during a sprawling 
tailgate party before kickoff. 
     . . . . 
     . . . [Y]oung people . . . predominated outside Jack Trice 
Stadium, where the Iowa State Cyclones hosted the Iowa 
Hawkeyes. 
     . . . . 
     Though he said nothing about the issues of the day, the 
audience seemed satisfied. “It was pretty cool; we got to see him,” 
said Braiden Loreno, a sophomore. “I’m definitely voting for 
him.”165 
It is probably inadvisable to take Mr. Trump’s stated “policy 
views” too terribly seriously. Indeed one commentator has written an 
article entitled The Serious Problem with Treating Donald Trump 
Seriously.166 
That we’re even talking about his “positions” means that we’ve 
already progressed to the dangerous Stage Two of the Trump 
phenomenon, as if his stated views are the standard by which 
Trump ought to be judged . . . . But looking for some kind of 
ideological thread in Trump’s various positions is a fool’s errand 
(and another victory for Trump). The appeal of Trump’s alleged 
 
drawn criticism for unveiling few detailed policy proposals, many of his 
supporters said they were unbothered. “When he gets in there, he’ll figure it 
out,” said Amanda Mancini, who said she had traveled from California to see 
Mr. Trump. “So we do have to trust him, but he has something that we can trust 
in. We can look at the Trump brand . . . .” Id. 
164 DONALD J. TRUMP WITH TONY SCHWARTZ, TRUMP: THE ART OF THE DEAL 40 
(1987). 
165 Trip Gabriel, Trump Gets Rock Star Greeting in Iowa (Oh, and Three Rivals 
Also Show Up), N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2015, at A22. 
166 Michael Kinsley, The Serious Problem with Treating Donald Trump Seriously, 
VANITY FAIR (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/10/the-
serious-problem-with-treating-donald-trump-seriously [https://perma.cc/69HL-
TVXX]. 
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views on every issue is their extremeness. That, and their seeming 
simplicity.167 
The football tailgater is Mr. Trump’s true métier and the standard by 
which he should be judged.168 “Though he said nothing about the 
issues of the day, the audience seemed satisfied.”169 (What more do 
you need to know?) 
In a highly unusual development, a “a senior official in the Trump 
Administration” has publicly raised concerns to a national audience in 
an anonymous New York Times Op-Ed, questioning inter alia 
President Trump’s intellectual and emotional maturity and his fitness 
for office. 
[W]e believe our first duty is to this country, and the president 
continues to act in a manner that is detrimental to the health of our 
republic. 
 
167 Id. (“Trump stands for the proposition that you don’t need to know much to run 
the government. You just need to use your common sense . . . .”). 
168 Cf. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 305 (1966). 
(“Hitler . . . during his lifetime exercised a fascination to which allegedly no one 
was immune . . . .”). Arendt described the effect Hitler had on his listeners: 
     The “magic spell” that Hitler cast over his listeners . . . rested 
indeed “on the fanatical belief of this man in himself,” on his 
pseudo-authoritative judgments about everything under the sun, 
and on the fact that his opinions . . . could always be fitted into an 
all-encompassing ideology. 
     . . . Society is always prone to accept a person offhand for what 
he pretends to be, so that a crackpot posing as a genius always has 
a certain chance to be believed. In modern society, with its 
characteristic lack of discerning judgment, this tendency is 
strengthened, so that someone who not only holds opinions but 
also presents them in a tone of unshakable conviction will not so 
easily forfeit his prestige, no matter how many times he has been 
demonstrably wrong. Hitler, who knew the modern chaos of 
opinions from first-hand experience, discovered that the helpless 
seesawing between various opinions and “the conviction . . . that 
everything is balderdash” could best be avoided by adhering to one 
of the many current opinions with “unbending consistency.” The 
hair-raising arbitrariness of such fanaticism holds great fascination 
for society because for the duration of the social gathering it is 
freed from the chaos of opinions that it constantly generates. 
 Id. at 305 n.1. 
169 Gabriel, supra note 165. 
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     That is why many Trump appointees have vowed to do what we 
can to preserve our democratic institutions while thwarting Mr. 
Trump’s more misguided impulses until he is out of office. 
     The root of the problem is the president’s amorality. Anyone 
who works with him knows he is not moored to any discernible 
first principles that guide his decision making . . . . 
     . . . . 
     In addition to his mass-marketing of the notion that the press is 
the “enemy of the people,” President Trump’s impulses are 
generally anti-trade and anti-democratic. 
     . . . . 
     It may be cold comfort in this chaotic era, but Americans 
should know that there are adults in the room. We fully recognize 
what is happening. And we are trying to do what’s right even when 
Donald Trump won’t. 
     . . . . 
     Given the instability many witnessed, there were early whispers 
within the cabinet of invoking the 25th Amendment, which would 
start a complex process for removing the president. But no one 
wanted to precipitate a constitutional crisis. So we will do what we 
can to steer the administration in the right direction until—one way 
or another—it’s over.170 
 
170 Opinion, The Quiet Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 6, 2018, at A23 (emphasis added); see also Dwight Garner, A Road Map of 
‘Crazytown,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2018, at C1 (book review) (“The reality was 
that the United States in 2017 was tethered to the words and actions of an 
emotionally overwrought, mercurial and unpredictable leader. Members of his 
staff had joined to purposefully block some of what they believed were the 
president’s most dangerous impulses. It was a nervous breakdown of the 
executive power of the most powerful country in the world.” (quoting BOB 
WOODWARD, FEAR: TRUMP IN THE WHITE HOUSE, at xxii (2018)). I have not 
even discussed President Trump’s mounting “legal” troubles (in the narrow 
sense). The following will have to suffice: 
     Eventually, the whole Robert Mueller investigation will reach 
its conclusion and the story will be restored to clear view. But even 
now we know what Trump seems unable to comprehend—that he 
is a key reason why the investigation keeps going. This is not 
because he is reviled by the establishment for his politics, but 
because of what the investigation and his response have already 
revealed about this character: his disregard of legal limits when it 
is in his personal and political interest to ignore them, and his 
persistent failure to render an honest accounting of his actions . . . . 
     . . . . 
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The President’s response? “‘The New York Times is failing,’ Trump 
said in the East Room. ‘If I weren’t here, I believe The New York 
Times probably wouldn’t even exist.’”171 
III. COUNSEL FOR THE SITUATION 
A. Defending Liberal Democracy 
In a liberal democracy, the most significant bulwarks against 
authoritarian tyranny may be classified as follows: Input Controls, 
Process Controls, and Output Controls.172 
Input Controls determine, directly or indirectly, who shall have a 
seat at the table—a vote in the polity. It is possible to imagine 
extraordinary scenarios in which the principle of universal political 
participation might justifiably be suspended. Perhaps the following 
will sound faintly familiar: 
Imagine a totalitarian clique taking advantage of an economic 
crisis to exploit popular discontent. The propaganda machine 
spreads the word: If only Adolf or Benito or Vladimir were in 
command, they would have the wisdom to make the sun rise once 
more in the heavens. This messianic message gains a powerful 
political following, both on the streets and in the ballot box. What 
then?173 
Of course, as Ackerman acknowledges, “crudities like barring 
totalitarian groups from parliament must be recognized as the acts of 
 
     Trump’s chronic scorn for the law and legal institutions, 
together with his trademark dishonesty, are not the only ways in 
which the president has presented the prosecutors with a damaging 
picture of himself and his motives. Those attributes appear in the 
specifics of his conduct as both president and, before then, as 
candidate, and it is reflected in the conduct of many of those whom 
he has chosen to assist him in his affairs. 
 Bob Bauer, Trump’s Contempt for the Law Will Be His Downfall, ATLANTIC 
(Aug. 26, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/08/trumps-
contempt-for-the-law-will-be-his-downfall/568564/ [https://perma.cc/LP9V-
A9AM]. 
171 Andrew Restuccia et al., ‘It’s Open Season on the President’: Op-Ed Unleashes 
West Wing Meltdown, POLITICO (Sept. 5, 2018, 4:36 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/05/trump-official-comes-out-against-
the-president-in-anonymous-times-op-ed-808714 [https://perma.cc/5EA7-9EA9] 
(last updated Sept. 5, 2018, 10:30 PM). 
172 ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 302–13. 
173 Id. at 304. 
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desperation they are.”174 (On the other hand, as has also been well 
observed, the United States Constitution is not a “suicide pact.”)175 
Among the more indirect approaches: “[I]t is possible to imagine 
structural measures that will affect the long-term liberality of the social 
forces that push their way into the governmental arena. The question 
here is political education in its broadest sense.”176 
Process Controls address features of institutional design—the way 
formal institutions structure participation in the affairs of state. In the 
American setting, the notion of Process Controls is largely a nod to the 
legacy of The Federalist No. 10 (Madison) and its familiar analyses of 
federalism, separation of powers, and checks and balances as 
constitutional safeguards against the tyranny of “faction.” In the 
present circumstances, however, Ackerman’s description of Process 
Controls sounds hopelessly naive: 
The goal is to remove law-making authority from the hands of a 
single statesman or easily organized clique. No official’s word 
becomes law when it is spoken; each power holder is 
constitutionally obliged to persuade others whose tenure does not 
depend on their passive acquiescence. This idea is taken to its 
extreme in the American system, where President, Supreme Court, 
and the two Houses of Congress are deprived of the power of 
unilateral command in the hope of forcing each to engage the 
others in a convincing effort at conversation.177 
These Process Controls are supposed to “make it costly for statesmen 
to indulge authoritarian pretensions.”178 (But what if the statesmen are 
billionaires?) 
Output Controls attempt to place some political and legal outcomes 
permanently beyond the reach of government, as with the “absolute” 
prohibitions of a Bill of Rights. Counter-majoritarian judicial review 
and the jurisprudence of fundamental rights are thereby tasked with 
protecting certain outcomes against “the tyranny of the majority.”179 
The following discussion draws on versions of both Input Controls 
and Output Controls. 
 
174 Id. at 305. 
175 See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting). 
176 ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 305 (emphasis added). 
177 Id. at 306. 
178 Id. at 303 (emphasis added). 
179 See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in J. S. MILL ON 
LIBERTY IN FOCUS 21, 23–30 (John Gray & G.W. Smith eds., 1991). 
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B. A Proposed Constitutional Amendment 
For purposes of discussion, it may be useful to set out a proposed 
constitutional amendment designed to address some of the above 
issues. The intention of the amendment is to cultivate a more 
thoughtful, informed, judicious, and “politically educated” electorate. 
 
Section 1. 
Education is a fundamental right of all people in the United States. 
This right may neither be denied without Due Process of law nor 
abridged in any manner inconsistent with the Equal Protection of 
the laws. No State may deny or abridge access to education, at any 
level, based on inability to pay. 
Section 2. 
No person born or naturalized in the United States shall be eligible 
to vote, without first having earned a high school diploma or the 
equivalent (as granted by a duly accredited school district). This 
provision applies only to persons who shall not have attained to the 
age of fifty years by the time this article is ratified; upon 
ratification, this provision shall go into effect after three years have 
passed. 
No person born or naturalized in the United States after ratification 
of this article, or within fifteen years prior to its ratification, shall 
be eligible to vote, without first having earned a college degree (as 
granted by a duly accredited institution of higher education). 
Enrollment in good standing at such an institution satisfies this 
requirement. 
Section 3. 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation. 
In many ways, this proposed amendment may be viewed as a radical 
measure. I view it as a proportionate response to a governmental crisis 
of epic proportions. 
In what follows, the historical and legal bases of this proposed 
amendment are set out in summary fashion. Then some of the broader 
implications of education and voting as safeguards of liberal 
democracy are explored. 
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C. The Long Arc of Footnote Four 
The U.S. Constitution makes explicit and implicit references to the 
virtues and value of education. In Article I, the Congress is 
empowered to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by 
protecting authors and inventors with copyright and patent laws.180 
The First Amendment protects “the freedom of speech, [and] of the 
press” against any “abridg[ment]” by Congress or the States.181 This 
language has been judicially interpreted to include an implied right of 
“freedom of association”182 as well as an implied “right to receive 
information.”183 Together, these express and implied provisions 
underwrite a grand intellectual and educational project known as “the 
marketplace of ideas,” which was given its seminal expression in a 
1919 dissenting opinion of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: 
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly 
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and 
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your 
wishes in law and sweep away all opposition . . . . But when men 
have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may 
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations 
of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better 
reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes 
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our 
Constitution.184 
What would it mean for education to be a “fundamental,” 
constitutional right? “Typically,” writes John Hart Ely, “what we mean 
by labeling something a constitutional right is that the state cannot 
deny it to everyone and that when it denies it to some but not others it 
had better have a very good reason for doing so.”185 Here, some 
background may be useful. 
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, an Oklahoma law labeled as “habitual 
criminals” those who committed two or more felonies involving 
 
180 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
181 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) 
(The First Amendment is enforceable against the States by virtue of its 
“incorporation” in the Fourteenth Amendment.). 
182 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958). 
183 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). 
184 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
185 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 234 n.30 (1980). 
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“moral turpitude.”186 Habitual criminals were subject to being 
“rendered sexually sterile.”187 
Skinner’s first felony was chicken stealing, obviously a crime of 
high “moral turpitude.” But the Oklahoma law made some 
conspicuous exceptions: “[O]ffenses arising out of the violation of the 
prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses, 
shall not come or be considered within the terms of this Act.”188 Thus, 
one could embezzle as much as one liked, and receive the same 
sentence as for comparable larceny—without ever being subject to 
sterilization. 
This the Supreme Court could not abide: 
[T]he nature of the two crimes is intrinsically the same and they 
are punishable in the same manner. Furthermore, the line between 
them follows . . . highly technical [distinctions] . . . . 
     . . . . 
     . . . [T]he instant legislation runs afoul of the equal protection 
clause, though we give Oklahoma that large deference which the 
rule of the [previous] cases requires.189 
The Court here refers to the rule, authoritatively expounded by James 
Bradley Thayer, that judicial review should generally defer to 
legislative choices (the so-called “presumption of constitutionality”). 
The legislature is the lawmaker in the first instance, and only if 
someone happens to challenge a law will it ever be judicially 
reviewed. (Both courts and legislatures know this.) In striking down 
legislation on grounds of unconstitutionality, the courts are in effect 
“intruding” on the work of a coordinate branch of government—the 
branch primarily entrusted with legislation.190 Thus, to overturn an 
 
186 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942). 
187 Id. at 536–37. 
188 Id. at 537. 
189 Id. at 539–41. 
190 See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 135–37 (1893) for a discussion of this 
issue: 
Not merely, then, do these questions, when presenting themselves 
in the courts for judicial action, call for a peculiarly large method 
in the treatment of them, but especially they require an allowance 
to be made by the judges for the vast and not definable range of 
legislative power and choice, for that wide margin of 
considerations which address themselves only to the practical 
judgment of a legislative body . . . . In so far as legislative choice, 
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allegedly mistaken law, the mistake must be so obvious that “those 
who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but 
have made a very clear one,—so clear that it is not open to rational 
question.”191 
If the Oklahoma law involved only the legislative categorization of 
crimes, no substantial constitutional question would be presented. 
(“States may do a good deal of classifying that it is difficult to believe 
rational.”)192 In Skinner though, as the Court emphasized: 
We are dealing . . . with legislation which involves one of the basic 
civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to 
the very existence and survival of the race. The power to sterilize, 
if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. 
In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are 
inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear . . . . 
 
ranging here unfettered, may select one form of action or another, 
the judges must not interfere, since their question is a naked 
judicial one. 
     . . . Now, it is the legislature to whom this power is given,—this 
power, not merely of enacting laws, but of putting an interpretation 
on the constitution which shall deeply affect the whole country, 
enter into, vitally change, even revolutionize the most serious 
affairs, except as some individual may find it for his private 
interest to carry the matter into court . . . . 
     It is plain that where a power so momentous as this primary 
authority to interpret is given, the actual determinations of the 
body to whom it is intrusted are entitled to a corresponding 
respect; and this not on mere grounds of courtesy or conventional 
respect, but on very solid and significant grounds of policy and 
law . . . . As the opportunity of the judges to check and correct 
unconstitutional Acts is so limited, it may help us to understand 
why the extent of their control, when they do have the opportunity, 
should also be narrow. 
191 Id. at 144. Thayer further notes: 
This rule recognizes that, having regard to the great, complex, 
ever-unfolding exigencies of government, much which will seem 
unconstitutional to one man, or body of men, may reasonably not 
seem so to another; that the constitution often admits of different 
interpretations; that there is often a range of choice and judgment; 
that in such cases the constitution does not impose upon the 
legislature any one specific opinion, but leaves open this range of 
choice; and that whatever choice is rational is constitutional. 
 Id. 
192 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927). 
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[Oklahoma] has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had 
selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment.193 
A few years earlier, in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 
Justice Stone had unveiled a new theory of heightened judicial review, 
several aspects of which seem to coalesce here: 
     There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption 
of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be 
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of 
the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when 
held to be embraced within the Fourteenth [Amendment] . . . . 
     It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which 
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected 
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected 
to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of 
legislation . . . . 
     Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into 
the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or 
racial minorities. [P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities 
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon 
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly 
more searching judicial inquiry.194 
As an initial matter, the “right to marry and have offspring” is 
arguably at the level of those explicitly protected liberties in the Bill of 
Rights.195 (Stone himself, writing a concurring opinion in Skinner, 
argues that the Oklahoma statute violates due process.)196 Second, in 
creating a disfavored underclass of “blue-collar felons,” Oklahoma has 
made “as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular 
race or nationality for oppressive treatment.”197 Nowadays, the right to 
 
193 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. 
194 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted); see also ELY, supra note 185, at 105 (discussing 
judicial review as it relates to the First Amendment). 
195 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. 
196 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 544–45 (Stone, C.J., concurring) (“There are limits to 
the extent to which the presumption of constitutionality can be pressed, 
especially where the liberty of the person is concerned . . . . A law which 
condemns, without hearing, all the individuals of a class to so harsh a measure 
as the present because some or even many merit condemnation, is lacking in the 
first principles of due process.”). 
197 Id. at 541 (majority opinion). 
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procreation would be considered a “fundamental right” and benefit 
from heightened judicial review on either of the above rationales. 
A constitutional amendment explicitly deeming education a 
fundamental right would, by definition, benefit from heightened 
review under Stone’s first paragraph. (Legislation inconsistent with 
such a right would then “appear[] on its face to be within a specific 
prohibition of the Constitution.”)198 But any restriction on the right to 
vote raises fundamental questions of its own, some of which are 
touched on in Stone’s second paragraph (the conceptual framework of 
“representation-reinforcing review”).199 
One of the things we mean by labeling something a right is that it 
shall not be denied, or granted in only watered-down form, to some 
subset of persons unless there is a good reason for doing so. 
     . . . . 
     . . . [I]t is therefore incumbent on the courts to ensure not only 
that no one is denied the vote for no reason, but also that where 
there is a reason (as there will be) it had better be a very 
convincing one.200 
 
D. A New Electorate 
Justice Stone cites two voting rights cases (twice) in Carolene 
Products footnote. Nixon v. Herndon involved a suit by a Black man 
who was denied the right to vote pursuant to a Texas statute providing 
that “in no event shall a negro be eligible to participate in a 
Democratic party primary election held in the State of Texas.”201 
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, dismissed defendants’ main 
argument—that the suit was “political”—as “little more than a play 
upon words . . . . That private damage may be caused by . . . political 
action and may be recovered for in a suit at law hardly has been 
doubted for over two hundred years . . . .”202 (Holmes then proceeds to 
cite a case from 1703, reported partly in Latin.)203 
 
198 Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
199 See ELY, supra note 185, at 87–88, 116–17. 
200 Id. at 118 n.*, 120. 
201 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927) (quoting Acts 38th Leg. 2d Called 
Sess. (1923) c 32, § 1 (Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. 1925, art. 3107)). 
202 Id. 
203 Ashby v. White (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 126; 2 Ld. Raym. 938. In that case Chief 
Justice Holt stated: 
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The invalidity of the Texas statute was not open to doubt, “because 
it seems to us hard to imagine a more direct and obvious infringement 
of the Fourteenth [Amendment],” writes Holmes; “[s]tates may do a 
good deal of classifying that it is difficult to believe rational, but there 
are limits . . . .”204 Little more than a decade later, those limits would 
have a new name (and a new theory): Stone’s “heightened judicial 
review.” 
The Herndon decision created “an emergency” in Texas—and the 
chilling prospect that a Black man might vote in a Democratic Party 
primary election.205 In response, the legislature of Texas hastily 
enacted a new statute providing, inter alia: “[E]very political party in 
this State through its State Executive Committee shall have the power 
to prescribe the qualifications of its own members and shall in its own 
 
It is not to be doubted, but that the commons of England have a 
great and considerable right in the government, and a share in the 
legislative, without whom no law passes; but because of their vast 
numbers this right is not exerciseable by them in their proper 
persons, and therefore by the constitution of England, it has been 
directed, that it should be exercised by representatives, chosen by 
and out of themselves, who have the whole right of all the 
commons of England vested in them . . . . 
 Id. at 134; 2 Ld. Raym. at 950. 
A right that a man has to give his vote at the election of a person to 
represent him in Parliament, there to concur to the making of laws, 
which are to bind his liberty and property, is a most transcendent 
thing, and of an high nature, and the law takes notice of it as such 
in divers statutes . . . . 
 Id. at 135–36; 2 Ld. Raym. at 953. 
If then when a statute gives a right, the party shall have an action 
for the infringement of it, is it not as forcible when a man has his 
right by the common law? This right of voting is a right in the 
plaintiff by the common law, and consequently he shall maintain 
an action for the obstruction of it. 
 Id. at 136; 2 Ld. Raym. at 954. 
Let us consider wherein the law consists, and we shall find it to be, 
not in particular instances and precedents; but on the reason of the 
law, and ubi eadem ratio, ubi idem jus. This privilege of voting 
does not differ from any other franchise whatsoever. 
 Id. at 138; 2 Ld. Raym. at 957. 
204 Herndon, 273 U.S. at 541. 
205 Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 82 (1932). 
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way determine who shall be qualified to vote or otherwise participate 
in such political party . . . .”206 Pursuant to this new statute, the State 
Executive Committee of the Democratic Party promptly adopted a 
resolution limiting participation in primaries to “all white demo-
crats . . . and none other . . . .”207 
Writing for the Court in Nixon v. Condon, Justice Cardozo 
observed that the clear intention of the new legislation was to separate 
“state action” (restrained by the Fourteenth Amendment) from the 
decision to exclude Blacks. “[P]rivate persons unconnected with [the 
S]tate”—for example, the plenary membership of the Texas Demo-
cratic Party, assembled in convention—might have prescribed the 
qualifications of its members.208 
Instead, the statute lodged the power in a committee, which 
excluded the petitioner and others of his race, not by virtue of any 
authority delegated by the party, but by virtue of an authority 
originating or supposed to originate in the mandate of the law. 
     . . . Power so intrenched is statutory, not inherent. If the [S]tate 
had not conferred it, there would be hardly color of right to give a 
basis for its exercise.209 
Once again, “the great restraints of the Constitution set limits to” the 
power of the State;210 and the right to vote had to be wrested forcibly 
from the malign grip of Texas by a stubbornly persevering plaintiff, 
wielding the Fourteenth Amendment as a powerful sword. 
Today, the “American experiment” in enlightened self-governance 
must be written off—for now at least—largely as a failure.211 
 
206 See id. 
207 See id. 
208 Id. at 83. “[In State conventions] platforms of principles are announced and the 
tests of party allegiance made known to the world. What is true in that regard of 
parties generally is true more particularly in Texas, where the statute is explicit 
in committing to the [S]tate convention the formulation of the party faith.” Id. at 
85. 
209 Id. at 84–85. The Court in Condon acknowledged that a recent state court 
decision had found that the statute in question constituted an express “‘grant of 
power’ to the State Executive Committee . . . to determine who shall participate 
in [primary elections]” because “the Legislature grant[ed] th[is] power in 
language too plain to admit of controversy . . . .” Id. at 87 n.1 (quoting Love v. 
Buckner, 49 S.W.2d 425, 426 (Tex. 1932)). 
210 Id. at 89. 
211 See David Remnick, The Unwinding of Donald Trump, NEW YORKER (July 17, 
2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-unwinding-of-
donald-trump [https://perma.cc/KFP6-DW7R]. Rather than enlightenment: 
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Domestic ideologies of an unmistakably autocratic and authoritarian 
tenor, imperialist nationalism as foreign “policy,”212 willful disregard 
of scientific evidence, blinding ignorance enshrined in the adminis-
trative agencies, and routine lying on the part of the President213—
 
The vague sense of torpor and gloom that so many Americans have 
shouldered these past two years derives precisely from the 
[Presidency]. 
     . . . . 
     . . . [It has] raised dark suspicions and aroused the sickening 
feeling that we are living in the pages of the most lurid espionage 
novel ever written. Robert Mueller and his investigators may never 
get to the end of the mysteries that they are exploring. They may 
never get to the end of the myriad corruptions, furtive connections, 
and double-dealings. 
 Id. 
212 See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Opinion, Trump is China’s Chump, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/28/opinion/trump-china-
asia-pacific-trade-tpp.html [https://perma.cc/FAJ8-EV9Y]. 
213 David Leonhardt & Stuart A. Thompson, Opinion, President Trump’s Lies, N.Y. 
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/23/opinion/trumps-
lies.html [https://perma.cc/7QQ7-2QM8]; Jack Shafer, Week 62: Trump’s 
Losing a Tabloid War to His Own Lawyer, POLITICO (July 27, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/07/27/trump-lawyers-cohen-
giuliani-avenatti-davis-219075 [https://perma.cc/VU4Z-8ZTH]. 
Not since Donald Trump salted the New York tabloids in the 
1980s and ‘90s with his signature formula of leaks, lies and lunacy 
has our daily news diet tasted so vividly of scandal . . . . [Rudy] 
Giuliani’s client [President Trump] is one of the best-documented 
liars on the planet. Why should anybody believe anything a liar’s 
lawyer says in his defense? 
 Id. 
In his first year as President, Trump made 2,140 false claims, 
according to the [Washington] Post. In just the last six months, he 
has nearly doubled that total to 4,229. In June and July, he 
averaged sixteen false claims a day. 
     . . . . 
     . . . At this point, the falsehoods are as much a part of his 
political identity as his floppy orange hair and the “Make America 
Great Again” slogan. The untruths . . . are Trump’s political 
“secret sauce.” 
 Susan B. Glasser, It’s True: Trump Is Lying More, and He’s Doing It on 
Purpose, NEW YORKER (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/ 
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[H]is favorite moniker by far is “Witch Hunt”—embellished, in 
recent weeks, to “Rigged Witch Hunt”—which Trump has used a 
whopping 84 times this year alone in reference to Mueller’s 
investigation. 
     . . . Multiple studies have shown that when something is 
repeated often enough, people start to think of it as true, whether it 
actually is—a concept known as illusory truth. “When a statement 
is repeated, it starts to feel more familiar,” said Keith Payne, a 
psychology and neuroscience professor at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill. “That feeling of familiarity is easily 
interpreted as the feeling of truth.” Payne is the co-author of a 
study that found that even when people know a claim is false, just 
a few repetitions can make them more likely to think it’s true. 
 Olivia Paschal, Trump’s Tweets and the Creation of ‘Illusory Truth,’ ATLANTIC 
(Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/how-
trumps-witch-hunt-tweets-create-an-illusory-truth/566693/ 
[https://perma.cc/6MAP-JEZF]. 
214 Andrew G. McCabe, former Acting Director and Deputy Director of the FBI, 
writes: 
People do not appreciate how far we have fallen from normal 
standards of presidential accountability. Today we have a president 
who is willing not only to comment prejudicially on criminal 
prosecutions but to comment on ones that potentially affect him. 
He does both of these things almost daily. He is not just sounding a 
dog whistle. He is lobbying for a result. The president has stepped 
over bright ethical and moral lines wherever he has encountered 
them. Every day brings a new low, with the president exposing 
himself as a deliberate liar who will say whatever he pleases to get 
whatever he wants. 
 Andrew G. McCabe, Every Day is a New Low in Trump’s White House, 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 
archive/2019/02/andrew-mccabe-fbi-book-excerpt-the-threat/582748/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y4QR-A7WL]. See also Dwight Garner, In ‘The Threat,’ 
Andrew McCabe Issues the Latest Warning Call About Trump’s America, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/16/books/review-
threat-fbi-trump-andrew-mccabe.html [https://perma.cc/65J2-PM7D] (book 
review) (“What more could a person do to erode the credibility of the 
presidency?” (quoting ANDREW G. MCCABE, THE THREAT: HOW THE FBI 
PROTECTS AMERICA IN THE AGE OF TERROR AND TRUMP 217 (2019)). 
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Despite all this, the right to vote continues to be described as a 
cherished or “precious” right. If this were so, voting would be pursued 
with all the excitement and vigor of finding diamonds strewn along the 
streets or searching for solid gold Easter Eggs hidden in every 
meadow. But it is not. Americans have “voted with their feet” (or, 
rather, not), producing a pitiful turnout rate of 55.4% in the most 
recent presidential election, based on voting-age population.215 
The Census Bureau estimated that there were 245.5 million 
Americans ages 18 and older in November 2016, about 157.6 
million of whom reported being registered to vote. (While political 
scientists typically define turnout as votes cast divided by the 
number of eligible voters, in practice turnout calculations usually 
are based on the estimated voting-age population, or VAP.) 
. . . [I]n 2016 . . . the actual number of votes tallied [was] nearly 
136.8 million.216 
This sorry statistic should be kept firmly in mind in the context of any 
proposal to restrict voting rights. Under our current system, the main 
“restriction” is imposed by potential voters themselves. 
Voting is not a precious right, but it could be. Restricting the 
electorate on the basis of educational qualifications is a proposition 
fraught with all the usual possibilities of unintended consequences. But 
the consequences of inaction are evident for all to see. They amount, 
as Roger Cohen suggests, to a “seeping, constant attempt—one sacred 
value at a time—to disorient Americans to the point they accept the 
unacceptable, cede to the grotesque, acquiesce to total arbitrariness as 
a governing principle.”217 
 
215 Dwight R. Lee, Voting with Ballots Versus Voting with Your Feet, LIBR. ECON. 
& LIBERTY (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2018/ 
Leevoting.html [https://perma.cc/Z9NR-7R4H]; see also Gregory Wallace, 
Voter Turnout at 20-Year Low in 2016, CNN (Nov. 30, 2016, 10:48 AM) 
https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/11/politics/popular-vote-turnout-2016/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/95L5-7ZGN]. 
216 Drew DeSilver, U.S. Trails Most Developed Countries in Voter Turnout, PEW 
RES. CTR. (May 21, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/ 
21/u-s-voter-turnout-trails-most-developed-countries/ [https://perma.cc/5JXL-
Y4D5]. 
217 Roger Cohen, Trump 2020 Is No Joke. Nor Are the Head-Spinning Distractions, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2017, at A18; cf. George Packer, Get Out and Vote, NEW 
YORKER, Aug. 6 & 13, 2018, at 13: 
The midterm elections in November are the last remaining obstacle 
to President Trump’s consolidation of power. None of the other 
forces that might have checked the rise of a corrupt homegrown 
oligarchy can stop or even slow it. The institutional clout that 
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The Supreme Court does not dispute that “education . . . bears a 
peculiarly close relationship to other rights and liberties accorded 
protection under the Constitution.”218 Thus, a constitutional amend-
ment imposing an educational requirement for voting does not simply 
stand in opposition to voting rights—as an irrelevant obstacle—the 
way a poll tax219 or a property requirement220 would. Arguably, 
education enhances the right to vote. Voting may be enhanced 
indirectly by education through greater and more insightful 
participation in freedom of speech (especially in the political 
“marketplace of ideas”); and directly, by counteracting modern 
society’s “characteristic lack of discerning judgment,” of which 
Hannah Arendt wrote.221 As the Supreme Court stated in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez: 
[Appellees contend] that education . . . is essential to the effective 
exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization 
of the right to vote. In asserting a nexus between speech and 
education, appellees urge that the right to speak is meaningless 
unless the speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts 
intelligently and persuasively. The ‘marketplace of ideas’ is an 
empty forum for those lacking basic communicative tools. 
Likewise, they argue that the corollary right to receive information 
becomes little more than a hollow privilege when the recipient has 
 
ended the Presidency of Richard Nixon no longer exists. The 
honest press, for all its success in exposing daily scandals, won’t 
persuade the unpersuadable or shame the shameless, while the 
dishonest press is Trump’s personal amplifier. The federal courts, 
including the Supreme Court, are rapidly becoming instruments of 
partisan advocacy, as reliably conservative as elected legislatures. 
It’s impossible to imagine the Roberts Court voting unanimously 
against the President, as the Burger Court, including five 
Republican appointees, did in forcing Nixon to turn over his tapes. 
(Brett Kavanaugh, Trump’s nominee to succeed Anthony 
Kennedy, has even suggested that the decision was wrong.) 
Congress has readily submitted to the President’s will, as if 
legislation and oversight were burdens to be relinquished. And, 
when the independent counsel finally releases his report, it will 
have only the potency that the guardians of the law and the 
Constitution give it. 
218 Summarizing arguments, see supra Part III.C, that the Court does “not dispute.” 
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). 
219 Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). 
220 See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 631–32 (1969). 
221 ARENDT, supra note 168, at 305 n.1. 
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not been taught to read, assimilate, and utilize available 
knowledge. 
     A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect to the right 
to vote. Exercise of the franchise, it is contended, cannot be 
divorced from the educational foundation of the voter. The 
electoral process, if reality is to conform to the democratic ideal, 
depends on an informed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot 
intelligently unless his reading skills and thought processes have 
been adequately developed. 
     We need not dispute any of these propositions. The Court has 
long afforded zealous protection against unjustifiable govern-
mental interference with the individual’s rights to speak and to 
vote.222 
Here the High Court pauses. “Yet,” observes Justice Powell, 
writing for the Court, “we have never presumed to possess either the 
ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective 
speech or the most informed electoral choice.”223 That those are 
“desirable goals . . . is not to be doubted”—but pursuing them would 
implicate public policy concerns foreign to the Court’s strictly judicial 
mandate.224 “[T]hey are not values to be implemented by judicial 
intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities”—hence the need for 
constitutional amendment.225 
The right to vote, and voting itself, are still ultimately something of 
a puzzle. Inside the voting booth—faced with an imponderable array 
of candidates for, say, Commissioner of Agriculture—the system 
seems primitive indeed. It is hard to see this as a rational way of 
imparting information. It is hard to see this banal, bureaucratic setting 
as the “primal scene” of democracy. On a strict cost-benefit analysis, 
voting in a national election (even in our convoluted Electoral College 
system) could be viewed as irrational.226 No national election in the 
United States has ever been decided by a single vote, nor would one 
ever be. Instead, one must look beyond such considerations for a 
voting “rationale.” 
Perhaps the best analogy is to consider voting “symbolic”—not 
unlike school spirit, esprit de corps, and patriotism itself. In other 
 
222 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35–36 (emphasis added). 
223 Id. at 36 (emphasis added). 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
226 See, e.g., Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Political Action in a 
Democracy, 65 J. POL. ECON. 135, 145–146, 149 (1957). 
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words, the purpose of voting is to encourage others to vote. It is an act 
of “symbolic solidarity.” “Individually”—the thinking goes—“we do 
not matter; our vote does not matter. But together we can make a 
difference.” The strongest and most informative routes to this outlook 
and its associated insights run directly through the educational system. 
Thus, the proposed article of amendment, while formally introducing 
more restrictive voter qualifications, may actually lead to greater 
participation in voting by a more thoughtful, informed, judicious, and 
politically educated electorate. 
At some point, the fears of young people will overwhelm the fears 
of the old. Some time after that, the young will amass enough 
power to act. It will be too late to avoid some catastrophes, but 
perhaps not others. Humankind is nothing if not optimistic . . . .227 
 
 
227 Nathaniel Rich, Losing Earth: The Decade We Almost Stopped Climate Change. 
A Tragedy in Two Acts, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 5, 2018, at 66. 
